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Abbreviations 
BAT: Banks’ Association of Turkey (Türkiye Bankalar Birliği, www.tbb.org.tr) 
BRSA: Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (Bankacılık Düzenleme ve 
Denetleme Kurumu, www.bddk.org.tr) 
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CBRT: Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey (Türkiye Cumhuriyet Merkez Bankası, 
www.tcmb.gov.tr) 
FRP: Financial Restructuring Programme 
ILO: International Labour Organisation (www.ilo.org) 
IMF: International Monetary Fund (www.imf.org) 
JBDSB: Joint Board of Directors of State Banks 
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SDIF: State Deposit Insurance Fund (Tasarruf Mevduatı Sigorta Fonu, www.tmsf.gov.tr) 
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LABOUR MARKET IMPLICATIONS OF LARGE-SCALE 
RESTRUCTURING IN THE BANKING SECTOR IN TURKEY 
 
1. Introduction 
Over the past 30 years, Turkey has had 22 Governments and during this period, 
macroeconomic and political instability has become a major feature of the country. 
Populist macroeconomic policies, moral hazard problems, huge public sector deficits, 
high real interest rates, overvalued Turkish lira, strong currency substitution, large 
current account deficits, volatile short-term international capital flows, extremely risk-
taking behaviour of banks, volatile economic growth, and high and persistent inflation 
resulted in several successive crises in the real and financial sectors in Turkey.1 The 
1994 financial crisis, which was regarded by many economists as the most severe 
economic crisis in Turkish history up until then, was followed by an even deeper 
financial crisis which hit the country hard between November 2000 and February 
2001. In the subsequent months, unemployment in the economy generally as well as 
in the financial sector increased dramatically, and the need for economic and 
structural reforms became even more apparent. 
After a period of restructuring of the banking sector and a rehabilitation programme 
from 2001 on, the sector seems to have recovered from crisis. On the political front, in 
the November 2002 election of Turkey’s 58th Government, the Justice and 
Development Party (AK-Party) captured 34.3 % of the total votes and succeeded in 
building a single-party government. After three years in office, the AK-Party 
Government has lowered inflation rates to single digit levels by continuing to 
implement the strict disinflation policies that were designed initially by the previous 
Government. It has also finished successfully pushing through the necessary 
legislative reforms to be able to start accession talks with the European Union (EU) 
on 3 October 2005, which may last more than ten years.  
Nevertheless, there are still millions of men and women in Turkey who have been 
unemployed for more than three years. A significant proportion of them appear to be 
well educated and were once employed in the banking sector. The total cost of the 
2000-2001 crisis in the banking sector alone is estimated to be as high as $53 billion, 
which is equivalent to 36% of Turkey’s GDP in 2001 (Steinherr et al., 2004).2 It is 
argued that if Turkey had adopted the legislative, regulatory and institutional 
                                                 
1 See Ertuğrul and Selçuk (2002), Kibritçioğlu (2001) and the references cited in there for more 
information on Turkey’s economic crises which occurred over the last two decades. 
2 See Table 2 at the end of this study. 
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framework of the EU banking system in the early 1990s, and had implemented and 
enforced these rules effectively, then the country probably would not have been faced 
with a severe banking crisis like that in the early 2000s, the financial cost of the crisis 
would have been much smaller (Berument and Togan, 2005) and unemployment in 
the country would not have risen so dramatically in the early 2000s. 
In general, this paper is concerned with the causes, timing and effects of banking 
sector restructuring and financial crisis in Turkey. The main focus of the study, 
however, will be on labour market implications of the banking crisis and banking 
reform in recent years. The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a brief 
summary of the macroeconomic background to the latest banking sector crisis in 
Turkey. In section 3, the efforts of recent Turkish Governments towards restructuring 
and rehabilitation of the banking sector are considered. Then, following a statistical 
review of the main features of the Turkish banking sector, section 4 focuses on the 
labour market problems that can be linked to the Government’s restructuring and 
rehabilitation programme in banking. Section 5 draws some lessons from this 
restructuring programme. Finally, section 6 concludes with some remarks on future 
prospects in the banking sector. 
2. Macroeconomic background 
In Turkey, the financial sector is dominated by banking activities, and banking has 
experienced several systemic crises since late 1970s (see Figure 1). In early 1980, in 
response to a strong balance-of-payments crisis accompanied by a deep recession and 
increased inflation, Turkey abandoned its inward-oriented development strategy and 
gradually started to introduce free-market based reforms. To liberalise the domestic 
financial system, many restrictions on domestic and external financial intermediation 
were removed or substantially reduced, between 1980 and 1989. The early attempt at 
domestic financial liberalization between 1980 and 1982 failed as a result of both the 
strong competition between banks and broker houses on interest rates and the lack of 
regulations for strengthening the legal basis of the Turkish banking sector.  
In 1982, five banks, along with many brokerage houses, were closed. During the 
liberalization process in the 1980s as a while, however, the number of commercial 
banks increased from 43 in 1980 to 66 in 1990, while their number of branches 
expanded from 5,954 to 6,560 with an accompanying rise in the number of employees 
from 125,312 to 154,089 over the same period (see Table 1, Figure 2 and Figure 3). 
As a result, the number of branches per bank declined from 138 in 1980 to 99 in 1990, 
with no significant change in the number of employees per branch (see Table 1 and 
Figure 2). Meanwhile, between 1980 and 1990, the number of foreign banks in 
Turkey increased from 4 to 23. 
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The opening of the Turkish economy to the rest of the world in the 1980s significantly 
increased the funding options abroad both for financial organisation and large 
corporations. However, it also increased the vulnerability of the domestic economy to 
external shocks. In Summer 1989, international capital flows were completely 
liberalised. Following this, the overvaluation of the Turkish lira and high domestic 
interest rates on government bonds attracted short-term capital inflows into Turkey. 
The so-called “hot-money” mechanism, which was driven mainly by the high real 
interest rates paid by the Government and the external open positions of Turkish 
banks, created a deep currency and banking crisis in early 1994 when it became 
apparent that this mechanism was no longer sustainable.3 Nevertheless, between 1994 
and 1999, the number of banks increased from 67 to 81, while the number of bank 
branches climbed from 6087 to 7691 causing employment to rise from 139,046 to 
173,988. The 1994 financial crisis resulted in Turkey being given a lower credit rating 
and in general pessimism about the economy. As a result, many small banks found it 
difficult to raise funds abroad. They, therefore, responded by expanding their 
domestic network of branches in an effort to collect more deposits. 
Between 1995 and 1997, both the continuing failure of Government to lower the 
public sector deficit as well as inflation and the re-emergence of the “hot-money” 
policy were accommodated by repeated excessive risk-taking behaviour on the part of 
the banking sector (see Figure 1). Even after the currency and banking crisis of 1994, 
many (mostly smaller) banks continued to abandon traditional banking activities in 
favour of using their funds to purchase government securities. 
Following the 1994 crisis, the Government introduced a full deposit insurance system 
(both for foreign and domestic currency savings accounts), which contributed 
significantly to creating ‘moral hazard’ problems in the banking sector. At the same 
time, the Government began placing weakened banks on the Treasury’s surveillance 
list for poor financial status but showed an unwillingness to close them. The number 
of listed banks rose to 15 between 1985 and 1999, and the financial position of many 
banks, which had largely abandoned sound banking practices started to deteriorate 
from around 1997.  
By the end of the 1990s, the sole function of the banking system in Turkey was 
virtually reduced to transferring funds from the domestic and international markets to 
                                                 
3 During the 1990s, the high real interest rates on government bonds, mainly caused by high public 
sector deficits, were highly attractive for private banks. Therefore, they started to borrow funds from 
abroad to buy government bonds. Meanwhile, the central bank was slowing down the depreciation 
of the Turkish lira, which was additionally attracting capital inflows from abroad. As a result of this 
“hot-money policy”, the share of government securities in total assets of domestic private banks and 
their open foreign exchange positions expanded significantly. This development increased the 
vulnerability of private banks both to changes in interest rates and in exchange rates. 
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the Treasury (Denizer et al., 2000). During the 1990s, most of the new domestic entry 
into the banking sector was from large industrial conglomerates founding their own 
banks, since the poor regulatory system enabled banks to lend large amounts to 
companies within their group (Denizer et al., 2000, and Damar, 2004). In addition, 
illegal activities, such as the transfer of bank funds to bank owners or executives 
through fictional loans, also increased in the late 1990s. 
 
Box 1: The Two Key Players in Turkish Banking: SDIF and BRSA 
The Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (SDIF, www.tmsf.gov.tr) had been founded with the Decree of Law On Banks 
Nr. 70, dated July 22, 1983. The task of administrating and representing the Fund was given to Central Bank of the 
Republic of Turkey (CBRT) with the regulation prepared by the Ministry. Arrangements of the said Decree of Law 
regarding the SDIF were legalised with the Banks Act Nr. 3182, dated April 25, 1985. With the Decree of Law Nr. 
538, dated June 16, 1994 the Fund was charged in strengthening and the restructuring the financial structure of the 
banks when necessary besides insuring savings deposits. Banks Act Nr. 4389, dated June 18, 1999 provisions that 
the Fund is to be administrated and represented by the Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (BRSA, 
www.bddk.org.tr). BRSA, founded on June 23, 1999 with the status of a public legal entity with administrative and 
financial autonomy, is established in order to ensure application of the said Act and other relevant acts, and to 
supervise and conclude such application, and to ensure that savings are protected and to carry out other activities 
and to exercise its authority defined in Banks Act by also issuing regulations within limits of authority granted by 
the Act in accordance with the article 3/1 of Banks Act Nr. 4389 and initiate to operate on August 31, 2000. In 
conclusion, the administration and the representation of SDIF having legal entity as of 1983 was firstly enforced 
by CBRT and than by BRSA. It was provisioned with the Act Nr. 5020 on “Making Amendments to the Banks Act 
and Some Acts” on December 26, 2003, that the decision-making body of the Fund is the Fund Board and general 
directorate and representation, implementation of the resolutions taken by the Fund Board is the duty of the 
chairman of the Fund. 
BRSA’s official mission is declared as “to safeguard the rights and benefits of depositors and to create the proper 
environment, in which, banks and financial institutions can operate with market discipline, in a healthy, efficient 
and globally competitive manner, thus, contributing to the achievement of long-run economic growth and stability 
of the country”. It aims to achieve the following five goals: 
? To enhance banking sector efficiency and competitiveness - elimination of distortions created by the state 
banks; strengthening of the banks’ capital base; reduction of the banks’ intermediation costs; minimization of 
group banking and non-financial activities. 
? To maintain confidence in the banking sector - in accordance with market discipline and “self responsibility” 
principle, to design the proper regulation for public awareness; making adequate, understandable and accurate 
information accessible to the markets in a timely manner; promoting international best standards in 
accounting and reporting systems; providing a transparent environment in which information on risks is clear 
and accessible for all parties. 
? To minimise the potential risks to the economy from the banking sector - prevention of all kinds of 
transactions and practices that can jeopardise the smooth and safe operation of the banks; developing early 
warning and prompt correction systems to prevent individual problems from causing systemic risk. 
? To enhance the soundness of the banking sector - enhancing the flexibility of the sector against risks; giving 
importance to the improvement of corporate governance; developing internal control and risk management 
systems; taking market risk into account in calculation of capital adequacy; improving the BRSA’s capacity 
for risk-focused and consolidated supervision and control. 
? To protect the rights of the depositors - establishing a balance between the adverse effects of deposit 
insurance, such as erosion in market discipline and increase in moral hazard, and the need to protect the rights 
of depositors. 
Source: SDIF and BRSA. 
 
The number of state-owned banks in the sector diminished from 12 in 1980 to 8 in 
1990, and then to 4 in 1999. During the 1990s, Governments usually used these banks 
for a number of non-commercial activities such as supporting agriculture (Togan, 
2004). This led to them incurring so-called “duty loses”, or unrecovered costs from 
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undertaking duties on behalf of the Government, and they covered their need to 
finance these by borrowing from the market at very high interest rates at short 
maturities, so pushing up interest rates even further. These “duty loses” were shown 
on the balance sheets of state banks as performing assets accruing interest instead of 
as subsidised lending. At the end of 2000, they amounted to 50% of their balance 
sheet value (BRSA, 2003), while the stock of accumulated “duty losses” had reached 
almost 13% of GNP in 1999 (World Bank, 2000). 
In the late 1990s, the ill-conceived macroeconomic policies of Governments, along 
with the excessive preference for risk-taking on the part of privately-owned banks, led 
to a similar situation as in the late 1970s, which was characterised by an “over-
branched” and “over-staffed” banking system (Zaim, 1995, and Akçay, 2001). As a 
combined result of (i) non-feasible investment and unprofitable production decisions 
on the part of domestic industrialists, (ii) the lending connected to this and (iii) illegal 
activities in the banking sector, the weight of non-performing loans in the banks’ 
portfolios increased significantly, especially after 1997. At the same time, the 
increasing open positions of banks on foreign exchange markets gave rise to growing 
exchange-rate risk. By early 1999, the banking system was very vulnerable to a 
systemic crisis. In 1999, the State Deposit Insurance Fund (SDIF), which had been 
founded on July 22, 1983, took over six insolvent banks, using the authority given to 
it in 1994 when full deposit insurance was introduced (see Table 3 and Box 1). 
In December 1999, the Government introduced a three-year (2000-2002) disinflation 
and macroeconomic restructuring programme, which was essentially an exchange-
rate-based stabilization programme supplemented by fiscal adjustment and structural 
reform measures involving reform of agriculture, pensions, fiscal measurement, tax 
policy and administration combined with greater transparency. There were also 
measures to strengthen and regulate the banking sector. An independent Banking 
Regulation and Supervision Agency (BRSA) was established (see Box 1)4 and became 
fully functional in August 2000, taking over the supervisory powers and 
responsibilities previously divided between the Undersecretariat of the Treasury and 
the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey.5 
                                                 
4 According to the Banks Act No. 4389, dated June 18, 1999, it was decided that the SDIF will be 
administrated and represented by the BRSA. However, on December 26, 2003, the administration of 
SDIF was transferred to the newly formed Fund Board of SDIF. 
5 The major purpose of BRSA is to prevent all kinds of transaction and practice that might endanger 
the rights of savers and the regular and safe operation of banks, and might cause important losses in 
the economy, and to take all decisions and implement all measures required for ensuring the 
efficient operation of the credit system. It also aims to increase the efficiency and the 
competitiveness of the banking sector, to maintain public confidence in the sector, to minimise the 
effect of losses the sector might create on the economy, to improve the viability of the sector, and to 
protect the rights and interests of savers. 
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Initially, the 2000-2002 programme was relatively successful. Interest rates fell 
sharply below expected levels, inflation slowed down significantly, and production 
and domestic demand started to increase. Despite achieving some remarkable results 
in a short space of time, the programme had to be revised because of two successive 
liquidity and exchange-rate crises; first in November 2000, as a result of the 
extremely risky position of a medium-sized bank (Demirbank) with large holdings of 
government securities, and then in February 2001. The Government abandoned its 
crawling-peg policy and floated the Turkish lira in February 2001. This seems have 
been a response to the banks in Turkey being hit by three major shocks:  
i) a sharp increase in funding costs due to the increase in interest rates and a 
mismatch in maturities,  
ii) capital losses due to a sharp mark-to-market decline in the value of holdings of 
government securities; 
iii) capital losses due to a sharp fall in the exchange rate and an open foreign currency 
position (BRSA, 2001). 
According to unofficial estimates, between 2000 and 2002, more than 2 million 
people lost their jobs in Turkey. Meanwhile, the decline in employment in the banking 
sector as a whole amounted to around 47,130, a reduction of 29% in relation to the 
number employed at the end of 2000. Tens of thousands of banking employees, who 
were mostly relatively well educated6 and well paid, became unemployed in 2001. 
The major events, which preceded both the 2000-2001 banking and currency crisis, 
and the following inevitable reform process in banking in May 2001, can be 
summarised in a chronologically as follows: 
                                                 
6 In Section 4 below the changes in the number of bank employees by gender and education are 
examined in more detail. 
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Date Event 
1978 - 1980 Balance-of-payments crisis, productivity slowdown and accelerating inflation 
January 1980 Announcement of a substantial stabilization and structural adjustment programme in order 
gradually to liberalise the economy 
1980 - 1982 Domestic financial liberalisation, followed by closure of five banks, along with many 
brokerage houses 
May 1981 Abandonment of the fixed exchange-rate regime 
July 22, 1983 SDIF founded 
June 1984 - 
August 1989 
Capital account liberalisation and convertibility of the Turkish lira 
December 1993 - 
April 1994 
Occurrence of a major currency crisis and acceleration in inflation; three small banks 
liquidation process started for three small banks in the aftermath of the crisis 
1995 - 1996 The banking sector recovered rapidly from the 1994 financial crisis 
1998 - 1999 First signs of an approaching banking crisis 
1997 - 2003 21 banks were taken over by the SDIF 
June 23, 1999 BRSA founded 
August 1999 Negative macroeconomic impact of the Marmara earthquake 
December 1999 Announcement of an exchange-rate-based stabilisation programme for 2000-2002 with only 
a weak emphasis on banking 
August 2000 BRSA became fully functional 
November 2000 & 
February 2001 
Occurrence of twin (banking and currency) crisis, and increasing political instability 
May 2001 Announcement of a new economic programme called ‘Transition to a Strong Economy’ for 
2001-2003;, the major component being the ‘Banking Sector Restructuring and 
Rehabilitation Programme’ 
2003 - 2004 Recovery of banking sector from crisis; almost all of the SDIF banks ‘resolved’ by 2004; 
two major state banks (Ziraatbank and Halkbank) still not privatised or merged, but 
thoroughly reorganised  
The following focuses on details of the banking reform in the aftermarth of the 2000-
2001 crisis and its labour market implications. 
3. Banking sector restructuring and rehabilitation 
In May 2001, in the aftermath of the 2000-2001 crisis, the Government initiated a new 
three-year programme “Transition to a Strong Economy”. The most significant 
component of the programme in terms of the structural reforms was the Banking 
Sector Restructuring and Rehabilitation Programme, which was aimed at (i) the 
operational and financial restructuring of state-owned banks with the ultimate aim of 
privatising them, (ii) prompt resolution of the private banks transferred to SDIF 
through merger, sale, liquidation and other means, (iii) strengthening privately-owned 
banks, and (iv) developing the legal and institutional framework to improve 
supervision and audit in the sector and make it more effective and competitive. 
According to the May 2001 programme, the Government’s intervention in Turkish 
banking was based on both existing and newly founded Organisations, such as the 
Joint Board of Directors of State Banks (JBDSB), SDIF and BRSA (see also Box 1 
above), while the participation of bank employees and banking trade unions in 
restructuring or resolution of banks was almost completely ignored: 
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Joint Board of Directors 
of State Banks 
(JBDSB, founded in April 
2001, dissolved in April 2005) 
Savings Deposit 
Insurance Fund 
(SDIF, founded in July 
1983) 
Banking Regulation and 
Supervision Agency 
(BRSA, founded in June 1999) 
State-Owned Banks 
JBDSB was authorised to 
restructure and prepare the 
state banks for 
privatisation. 
  
‘Problem’ 
Banks 
 SDIF targeted prompt 
resolution of 21 private 
banks transferred to the 
Fund between 1997 and 
2003. 
BRSA implemented the 
Bank Capital Strengthening 
Programme to strengthen 
the capital structure of 25 
banks identified as 
financially weak in the 
aftermath of the 2000-2001 
crisis. Privately-
Owned 
Banks 
‘Non-
problem’ 
Banks 
  BRSA aims to safeguard 
the rights and benefits of 
depositors and to create the 
proper environment in 
which banks and financial 
institutions can operate 
under market discipline, in 
a healthy, efficient and 
globally competitive 
manner. 
The details of activities of these three organisations are summarised below in sub-
sections 3.1 to 3.3. Implementation of the restructuring and rehabilitation programme 
imposed a substantial financial burden on the economy, as before in other countries 
with similar banking problems. Turkish government officials estimate that Turkey 
spent some USD 47.2 billion (or 32 % of GDP in 2001) between 1997 and 2003 to 
reform the banking sector and to eradicate the inherent structural weaknesses (BRSA, 
2003, and SDIF, 2005). Updated estimates (in Steinherr et al., 2004) suggest a total 
cost of USD 53.2 billion or 36% of GDP in 2001 (see Table 2). However, it should be 
noted that all of these estimates are based on publicly announced figures for the 
accumulated losses and financial failure of the banks and, accordingly, do not cover 
any spending associated with Government efforts to prevent or moderate the adverse 
labour market effects resulting from restructuring of state-owned banks and resolution 
of private banks. 
 
3.1. Restructuring of state-owned banks 
The three state-owned banks began to be administered by a newly established Joint 
Board of Directors (JBDSB), consisting of professional bankers, in April 2001. The 
Board was granted authority to restructure and prepare the state banks for 
privatisation.7 In June 2001, the state-owned Emlakbank was turned over to another 
                                                 
7 By early 2005, the financial and operational restructuring of the state-owned banks had been 
completed, and hence, the JBDSB had been abolished in April, 2005. Since then, the decisions 
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state-owned bank, Ziraatbank, since it was not functioning efficiently, and 96 of its 
406 former branches were transferred to Halkbank, also state-owned. Then in 
November 2004, Pamukbank, a private bank that had been under the control of SDIF 
since June 2002, was merged with Halkbank. 
Simultaneously, the Treasury had strengthened the capital of state banks, established a 
payment plan for the duty losses by issuing special bonds and eliminated their short-
term liabilities. Their interest rates on deposits were brought into line with market 
rates and the management of maturity and liquidity risks improved.  
As a result, both Ziraatbank and Halkbank began undergoing a process of 
restructuring from mid-2001, with fundamental changes in their organisational 
structures to bring them into line with the requirements of contemporary banking and 
international competition. Their staff ceased to be civil servants and were employed 
instead under private sector contracts.  
Not least importantly, tens of thousands of employees of state banks were classed as 
“employed in excess of requirements”, reflecting the excessive number of branches 
and staff. They were accordingly given financial incentives to take early retirement or 
obliged to transfer to other state institutions which operate outside the banking sector 
(see the figures in column 1 in Table 15). The pronounced labour market effects of 
this restructuring are discussed in section 4.1 below in more detail. 
 
3.2. Resolution of the private banks transferred to SDIF 
The 2002 Law on Restructuring of the Debts to the Financial Sector and Amendments 
to Some Laws No. 4743, established the legal framework for the strengthening the 
capital of private banks and restructuring the debts of insolvent companies with banks. 
Within this framework, legislative and institutional arrangements were adopted: 
• to accelerate the follow-up and collection proceedings of the banks in the Fund in 
terms of receivables and to strengthen the organisational structure of SDIF; 
• to provide capital support in order to strengthen the capital structures of the 
privately-owned banks; 
• to ensure the institutional and operational restructuring of the state banks and to 
enable them to participate in the process of restructuring the debts to the financial 
sector; 
                                                                                                                                            
regarding branches and staff have been made by the authorisauthorised bodies of the state banks in 
line with the in the sector and their own strategies in response to these. 
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• to prepare the framework agreements on financial restructuring programmes and 
to establish asset management companies, 
• to ensure tax exemption for the institutions signing framework agreements. 
SDIF’s resolution practices since 1997 are summarised in Figure 4 and Table 3. 
Between 2001 and 2004, 12 banks of the 21 taken into the Fund since late 1990s were 
resolved through merger, and five of them were sold to private investors. In addition, 
as noted above, another one, Pamukbank, was transferred to a state bank. By the end 
of September 2005, the total number of banks in Turkey had fallen to 48, and only 
one of the SDIF banks (Bayındırbank) with 401 employees was still under the control 
of the Fund, while one bank (Türkbank) is in the process of being closed down and 
another (İmar Bank) was managed and supervised by SDIF. 
The latest BAT (Banks Association of Turkey) statistics indicate small increases in 
the overall number of employees and branches in the sector in the past year or two 
(see also Figure 2 and 3). These rises (which are in accordance with the recent 
movement of the BSF index in Figure 1), suggest that the Turkish banking sector 
seems to have recovered from the 2000-2001 financial crisis by the end of 2003. But a 
great many of the employees of the banks involved in the resolution programme as a 
result of the bad management practices in the late 1990s remain badly affected. The 
extent and nature of their difficulties are discussed in section 4.2 below. 
 
3.3. Strengthening of privately-owned banks 
Strengthening private banks, the financial structure and profitability of which were 
worsened by the 2000-2001 financial crisis, represents an important part of the 
Banking Sector Restructuring and Rehabilitation Programme. Under this programme, 
measures have been put into place for the recapitalisation of private banks, resolving 
Non-Performing Loans (NPLs), limitation of foreign-exchange open-positions and 
encouragement of mergers and acquisitions. A special Bank Capital Strengthening 
Programme was implemented to strengthen the capital structure of 25 banks, 
identified by BRSA in mid-2002 and to limit market risks8.  
                                                 
8 These banks went through a three-stage independent audit process, designed to assess their asset 
structure under the recapitalisation process (BAT, 2003). Following a number of meetings with their 
to discuss the extent to which they were affected by the crisis and to come up with proposals to solve 
their problems, the BRSA agreed with the banks concerned “time bound commitment letters” with 
plans to raise their capital adequacy ratios to 8% by the end of 2001. As a result, the banks’ financial 
statements were made more transparent, their capital base strnegthened and their exposure to market 
risks limited by the end of 2002. 
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3.4. Financial restructuring of insolvent non-banking firms 
In Turkey, the loan portfolio of the banking sector is now revised each year and the 
non-performing loans (NPLs) are classified in compliance with international 
standards, and necessary provisions are allocated. Significant progress has been 
achieved with the so-called Istanbul Approach, which is a voluntary debt restructuring 
mechanism for banks, developed to accelerate settlement of bad loans, following the 
2000-2001 financial crisis. The Istanbul Approach or Financial Restructuring 
Programme (FRP)9 was initiated in 2002 to create a framework for firms in the real 
economy which became insolvent during the crisis and which were considered to be 
important for the economy, so as to enable them to maintain their activities and to 
regain their solvency (BAT, 2005).10  
The Framework Agreement prepared by BAT11 was agreed by the creditor 
organisations in mid-2002. As of January 2005, a total of 329 companies had been 
brought under the scope of the agreement, 219 of which were large (35 groups), and 
110 small. A Framework Agreement had been concluded with almost all of these and 
the amount of restructured loans totalled USD 5.7 billion. 
 
3.5. Recent developments 
As stated in the Letter of Intent of the Turkish Government to the IMF in July, 2004, 
the Government’s efforts to strengthen the financial system continue on several fronts. 
In February 2003, under the leadership of the BRSA, a coordination committee was 
formed with representatives of BAT, to ensure rapid implementation of the New 
Capital Adequacy Agreement (Basel II), and capital adequacy arrangements (which 
are called CAD-3 under EU legislation). The limited deposit guarantee system was put 
into effect in July 2004. In summer 2004, the Government completed a 
                                                 
9 Law on Restructuring of the Debts to the Financial Sector and Amendments to Some Laws No. 4743 
and Regulation on General Conditions for Approval and Enforcement of Framework Agreements on 
Financial Restructuring Programme constituted the legal grounds of the framework agreement 
prepared under the financial restructuring programme known as the “Istanbul Approach”, modelled 
after the “London Approach” of the 1970s, which applies to banks and corporates supervised under 
the auspices of the Bank of England. It should be noted that the London Approach was a non-
statutory and informal framework introduced with the support of the Bank of England for dealing 
with temporary support operations mounted by banks and other lenders to a company or group in 
financial difficulties, pending a possible restructuring. 
10 The main provisions under the FRP are Law no. 4743 on the Restructuring of Debts to the Financial 
Sector and Amendments to Certain Laws, and the Regulation on the General Terms Pertaining to the 
Approval, Acceptance and Implementation of the Financial Restructuring Framework Agreement. 
11  All banks operating in Turkey are legally bound to become members of BAT and to obey the 
provisions of the Association’s statute and to adopt all the resolutions of the Board of Directors 
(BAT, 2005). 
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comprehensive review of the banking act to bring the legal framework more closely 
into line with EU standards. In October 2005, a new draft Banking Law, was approved 
by the Turkish Grand National Assembly. The new banking act and other relevant 
legislation suggest that the AK-Party Government is committed to maintaining the 
operational and financial independence of the BRSA and SDIF. 
4. Employment in banking: structure and developments  
Lack of data makes it difficult to examine employment developments in the banking 
sector in Turkey and the following analysis is based on investigating a range of 
sources and trying to piece together the effect of restructuring on those employed in 
the sector at the beginning of the process. Some estimation is, therefore, inevitably 
involved in doing this. 
The banking sector in Turkey consists of commercial banks and non-depository, or 
development and investment, banks. Commercial banks are mainly owned by the 
domestic private sector or the State, though there are also a few foreign banks. 
(Changes in number of banks, branches and employees by type of ownership between 
1961 and 2005 are given in Table 1. Selected indicators, which characterise the 
structural developments in the Turkish banking sector between 1990 and 2005, are 
presented in Table 4 and 5 and Table 6 and 7 show the numbers of employees and 
bank branches between 1995 and 2005 with respect to individual banks in the sector 
in 2005.) 
In Turkey, the commercial banking market has always been dominated by a small 
number of banks, as indicated by the proportion of assets, deposits and lending 
controlled by the largest few of them (see Table 5). The largest 5 banks were, 
therefore, responsible for almost 60% of deposits in 1990. This declined to under 50% 
by the late-1990s with the expansion in banks in the intervening period but has 
subsequently increased again to 64% by 2004 as a result of the restructuring in 
banking since 2002.  
The number of commercial banks operating in Turkey increased from 51 in 1961 to 
60 in 1998 while the number of development and investment banks rose from 1 to 15 
(see Table 1 and 4). Many new banks were set up during this period, the number 
falling during the 1970s in part because of acquisitions, but rising rapidly after 1980 
again as a result of the deepening of the financial markets and lifting of regulatory 
barriers restricting entry into the banking system.12 
                                                 
12 The reason for the falling number of state-owned banks in recent years is largely privatisation. It 
should also be noted that there was a significant increase in the number of foreign banks due to the 
implementation of industrial strategy based on liberalization policies in the 1980s. 
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The number of banks and bank employees reached an historically high level in 1999 
(see Table 4 and 6), before the crisis of 2000-2001. Prior to the crisis, the number of 
banks and bank branches was rising, as even more so were the salaries paid 
particularly by privately-owned and foreign banks to their employees in real as well as 
nominal terms. This reflects the fact that the demand for high-qualified employees in 
banking was increasing faster than the supply, resulting in frequent transfers of 
personnel between banks.13 Between 1985 and 1999, the average index of real salary 
per employee increased by 2.4 times (Figure 5). The scale of this rise indicates that 
bank employees were paid relatively well before 2001, despite the fact that the sector 
had been gradually moving into a severe systemic crisis from the early 1990s.14 
The three state-owned banks were dominant among commercial banks in terms of 
both employment and bank branches between 1995 and 2005, though both declined 
over the period (below and Tables 6 and7): 
 Distribution of Bank Employees (%) Distribution of Branches (%) 
 
Dec. 
1995 
Dec. 
2000 
Dec. 
2001 
June 
2005 
Dec. 
1995 
Dec. 
2000 
Dec. 
2001 
June 
2005 
Commercial Banks 71.7 69.5 85.4 96.6 73.5 70.0 86.8 99.7
State-owned Banks 41.0 35.3 40.8 30.1 37.6 31.0 39.4 33.7
Privately-owned Banks 29.8 32.8 40.4 61.5 35.4 38.0 43.7 62.5
Foreign Banks 0.7 1.1 3.9 4.7 0.3 0.7 3.4 3.4
Banks Under the Deposit Insurance Fund 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.0
Non-depository Banks 3.9 3.1 3.7 3.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3
Total of Open Banks 75.6 72.6 89.1 100.0 73.8 70.3 87.0 100.0
Number of Employees of Closed Banks 24.4 27.4 10.9 0.0 26.2 29.7 13.0 0.0
Sector Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
The main features and trends as regards the composition of employment (see Tables 8 
and 9) are as follows: 
• The share of women in employment in banking has been increasing continuously. 
The overall rise in the share of women from 39.5% in 1997 to 46.4% in 2005 is a 
result in particular of their increased employment in privately-owned commercial 
banks. State-owned commercial banks still hire more men than women, though 
their share in total employment is shrinking because of privatisation and 
restructuring in recent years. In addition, foreign banks usually hire more women 
than men. 
• The share of employees with university degrees in banking increased from 38% in 
1997 to 64% in 2005, again due to their increased employment in privately-owned 
                                                 
13 In the monthly journal Capital, issued on 1 August 2003, it is claimed that, prior to the crisis, a 
director of the central branch of a typical medium-sized bank in Turkey was earning about USD 
10,000 per month (net). This, however, fell to USD 3.5 – 4.0 by mid 2003. 
14 Unfortunately, there is no reliable and comparable data on salaries in banking after 2001 that would 
show what happened during the period of restructuring of banks in Turkey. 
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commercial banks. At the same time, the share of employees with upper 
secondary education declined from 58% to 35%, while the share of those with 
only basic schooling fell from 4% to just 1.6%. 
• There were more women among bank employees with university degrees than 
men over the period 1998-2005 (around 53%), though it is questionable whether 
there were also more women in senior positions than men. 
• The number of employees in commercial banking declined by over 50,000 from 
December 1999 to December 2002 (from 168,558 to 118,329), a reduction of 
30%. At the end of September 2005, the number employees was around 126,600, 
7% more than in December 2002. The number of employees with upper secondary 
education, however, fell by 44% (by 40,200) between 1999 and 2002, and it is still 
continuing to decline gradually. By September 2005, it had fallen overall by 52% 
over the preceding 5 years. The number of university graduates working in 
commercial banks, on the other hand, declined by 15.5% percent between 
December 2000 and December 2002 (from 74,369 to 62,844) but rose again to 
77,900 in 2005, more than 5 years earlier. 
• The changing educational composition of employees in commercial banks (see 
Tables 8 and 9 for details) can be summarised as follows: 
 
 Percentage Share of Commercial-Bank Employees with  
 University Degrees Upper secondary education Basic schooling Total 
December 1999 42.8 54.2 3.0 100.0 
December 2002 55.6 43.1 1.3 100.0 
June 2005 63.4 35.0 1.5 100.0 
 
Percentage Increase in Number of Commercial-Bank Employees between 
December 1999 and with University Degree with upper secondary education With basic schooling 
December 2002 - 8.9 - 44.1 - 70.2 
June 2005 10.2 - 51.8 - 62.2 
 
• The above figures suggest that, contrary to common belief in Turkey, most of the 
bank employees who lost their jobs during the last crisis are most probably those 
with upper secondary education rather than university graduates and, accordingly, 
are likely to have more difficulty finding alternative employment than has been 
assumed.  
It should be evident that the overall fall in the total number of bank employees is not 
an accurate indicator of the number of people who lost their jobs during the banking 
crisis of 2000-2001 or during the process of restructuring in 2001-2003, since the 
decline is the net result of opposing changes in employment. In reality, therefore, job 
losses were concentrated to a large extent among employees of state-owned and SDIF 
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banks being restructured, while many ‘non-problem’ banks continued to hire new 
people even in the middle of the crisis (though overall employment in such banks 
nevertheless declined significantly – see below). 
The starting-point for obtaining an indication of the relative scale of unemployment 
caused by restructuring in the sector is to consider the economy-wide employment 
and unemployment figures for recent years. Employees in commercial banks in 
Turkey represented under 0.8 percent of total employment in the first half of the 
2000s and those in the financial intermediation sector as a whole, under 1.4% (Table 
10). The official unemployment figures (based on the State Institute of Statistics’ 
(SIS) Household Labour Survey) show that the number of unemployed from the 
financial intermediation sector as a whole rose from 12 thousand in 2000 to 26 
thousand in 2002, or from 0.8% to 1.1% of the total unemployed (Table 11).15  
These figures seem confusing at first sight because the number of employees in 
banking fell by 47.1 thousand over the same period. To understand better what 
happened to these employees, there is a need to differentiate between those who 
worked for state-owned banks included in the restructuring programme and those who 
worked for SDIF banks. 
 
4.1. Labour market effects of restructuring of state-owned banks 
Between 2001 and 2004, significant steps were taken to reduce the number of 
employees and branches of state-owned banks to ‘rational’ levels (see Table 12). The 
number of personnel was, accordingly, reduced by 43% between December 2000 to 
December 2002 (from 70,191 to 40,158) and by 46% (to 37,994) by December 2003. 
As compared with 1999, over 34 thousand people classified as being ‘employed in 
excess of requirements’, were encouraged by public authorities to take early 
retirement or were obliged to transfer to other state institutions outside the banking 
sector. In addition, in late 2004, the privately-owned Pamukbank, under the control of 
SDIF for two years, merged with Halkbank so causing employment to increase in the 
latter (and in the state-banking sector as a whole) (see Table 15). 
According to the official figures (announced in July 2003), 17,648 of the Ziraatbank 
and Halkbank employees, who were eligible to do so under the legislation, retired and 
did so within the prescribed time limit so as to be eligible for a bonus payment of 30% 
                                                 
15 As also described above, the 2000-2001 banking sector crisis was accompanied by a crisis in the real 
economy which also contributed significantly to the increase in overall unemployment in Turkey. 
The share of the unemployed persons from financial internediation in total unemployed was 
therefore limited to 1.1% instead of rising up to 1.7%, which would have been the case if total 
unemployment had remained at its 2000 level (see Table 11). 
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of their retirement pension (Table 14). In addition, 14,352 employees, who were 
neither ready to retire nor willing to give up their rights as civil servants, were shifted 
to other parts of the public sector by the State Personnel Department. 
Accordingly, almost none of the state bank employees became unemployed as a result 
the restructuring process. The author’s calculations in Table 14 indicate that the 
number of employees who became unemployed or had to change their job as a result 
of the restructuring of state-owned banks was only around 2,000. 
Nevertheless, it is evident that the restructuring process resulted in many employees 
being forced to retire or leave the banking sector reluctantly. The main grievance 
seems to be among those classified as “employed in excess of requirements” obliged 
to shift to other state institutions (grievances which have come to light airing these via 
the internet) 
In June 2004, three organisations, the Independent Trade Union of Office Employees 
(BÇS), the Association for State Banking (Kamubank-Der) and the Centre for 
Improving Public Sector Entrepreneurship (KİGEM), formed a joint body called the 
‘Platform of State-Bank Employees’, to monitor the privatisation process in banking, 
and to work towards initiating the preparation of a new legal regulation to make it 
possible for employees who have been transferred to return to their previous jobs in 
state banks, to coordinate and unify the legal fight of ex-employees of state banks 
(around 5,000 people) against government regulations in state banking, and to contest 
the merger of Pamukbank with Halkbank in 2004. In criticising the measures taken to 
restructure state banks, ex-employees argue that: 
(a) the criteria used to determine whether a person is “employed in excess of 
requirements” is unclear and arbitrary, 
(b) the personal rights of state-bank employees who were transferred have been 
infringed as they have been downgraded virtually to the level of beginners in the 
state institutions to which they were moved, 
(c) the employees concerned have not been entitled to receive any increase in salary 
until the monthly salary of existing personnel in the institutions in question has 
risen to the level formerly paid in state banks; 
(d) employees who wished to keep their jobs in state banks were obliged to give up 
their civil servant status as this no longer applied to those employed in the banks 
concerned; 
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(e) the merger of privately-owned Pamukbank with state-owned Halkbank in 2004 
was ‘illegal and unfair’ because it led to a renewed increase in employment in 
state banks only a few years after thousands of Halkbank employees had had to 
retire or involuntarily transfer to a job outside banking; 
(f) the Government failed to privatise the state banks within three years as it had 
promised, so deceiving former state-bank employees. 
Even today, five years after restructuring of state banks began, there are many ex-
employees of these who were transferred to other state institutions who still hope to 
return to their former jobs and continue to fight to improve their reduced status in 
their new places of work. Daily newspapers in Turkey, therefore, still report almost 
every month a new court decision relating to cases brought by the ex-personnel of 
state banks. 
Of the reduction of 46% or so in the number of state-bank employees between 1999 
and mid-2005, 42.% consist of employees who retired and received a bonus grant for 
doing so, while 52% comprise the personnel who have been transferred to non-bank 
state institutions (Table 12 and 14). The remaining employees (including those in 
Vakıfbank which is mainly owned by the General Directorate of Foundations (GDF)), 
have been forced to convert from civil servant status into “contract employee” status, 
with a specified duration of employment.  
The educational composition of employees in state banks, meanwhile, has changed 
markedly in favour of university graduates, the Pamukbank-Halkbank merger 
seeming to have significantly contributed to this shift (Table 15). 
 
4.2. Labour market effects of resolution of SDIF banks  
Between 1997 and 2003, the SDIF took over 21 banks with 39,409 employees and 
succeeded in creating new job places for 11,635 in their new banks (as officially 
reported in BRSA, 2003). Table 13 and Table 14 show the effects of SDIF practices 
on the number of employees of ‘resolution’ banks in detail. Some 27,774 employees 
of SDIF banks either retired or had eventually to leave the banking sector in the 
‘resolution’ process. Unfortunately, there is no reliable statistical information for 
estimating the number who became unemployed or what happened to them 
subsequently. Nor is it possible to differentiate between them according to their 
education level. The following is, therefore, based on piecemeal information and is, 
therefore, essentially illustrative. 
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The author’s investigations among current bank employees of non-problem banks 
indicates that during the resolution process many personnel of SDIF banks shifted to 
other sectors and started to work as owners of small restaurants, translation offices, 
bookshops, and consultancy and education/training firms, specialising to a large 
extent in areas relating to banking and finance.16 Since 2003, in particular, a small 
number of them have been hired by the BRSA or SDIF to work on the financial 
restructuring of insolvent non-banking firms. Some, in addition, seem to have left 
Turkey to work abroad. 
In 2003, under the sponsorship of the World Bank, three state institutions, the Turkish 
Employment Agency (İŞKUR), the Privatisation Administration (ÖİB) and the Small 
and Medium Industry Development Organisation (KOSGEB), jointly initiated a 
retraining project exclusively for “high-qualified ex-bank-employees, who graduated 
from universities, have basic computer skills, were employed in the financial sector, 
are under 46, and resident in Istanbul”.17 (The project was carried out by Profit 
International, a consultancy firm based in Istanbul, under the title “Siz DeğerSiniz”).18 
The project was designed for just 900 people with the aim that at least 150 would find 
a job (in or outside the banking sector) after finishing the programme. As many as 
3,000, however, applied to participate in the project Of the 900 who completed the 
one-year programme starting in October 2003, some 225 had reportedly found a job 
by September 2004, and it was expected that this figure would double within two to 
three months.19 
A recent survey (conducted by the Research Centre of Active Academy) among 204 
randomly chosen bank employees indicates, moreover, that most of those who did not 
lose their job during the crisis and the restructuring were also unhappy with their 
situation as of mid 2004. Some 70% of those surveyed were seriously thinking of 
looking for a job outside banking because of the lower earnings they were now 
getting. 
                                                 
16 It is generally believed that they were able to open their own companies because they were paid well 
prior to the banking crisis. 
17 Actually, the project was designed as an addition to the broad “Privatisation Social Support Project” 
(PSSP), which was already started as a result of the meetings held by the World Bank, IMF, Turkish 
Treasury, İşkur, ÖİB and KOSGEB from January 2000 onwards. For further information about the 
PSSP, see www.oib.gov.tr/sosyal_destek/social_project.htm. See also Auer and Popova (2003) on 
this. 
18 The title “Siz DeğerSiniz” actually has a double meaning in Turkish: Firstly, it means “you are 
worth it”, and secondly, “you are the value”. 
19 Since the Profit International avoids giving the latest information on issue, it is unfortunately not 
possible to know whether this has indeed been the case. 
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A more recent survey (conducted by Ergeneli and Arı, 2005) among 220 bank 
managers working for non-SDIF bank branches located in Ankara was aimed at 
finding out whether they considered downsizing as an opportunity for their personal 
growth or simply as a development that increased their workload as well as raising 
concerns that they might be among the next to be laid-off. The study reveals that 
managers working in banks where employees had been laid off felt less commitment 
to the organisation, less trust in senior management and empowered than those 
working in banks where there were no lay-offs.  
4.3. Unionisation in banking and the role of trade unions during the crisis 
In Turkey, there is a general distinction between trade unions according to whether 
they are in the private or public sector. Unions of workers in private firms are 
established on an industrial basis (in line with the Unions Act, No. 2821 of May 
1983). Membership of a union is voluntary and there is no obligation to conclude a 
collective agreement in all businesses or places of work. Such agreements (which are 
covered by the Collective Bargaining Agreements, Strikes, and Lock Outs Act, No. 
2822, also of May 1983) cover only workers who are members of a trade union. A 
trade union can be authorised to negotiate a collective bargaining agreement if it 
covers at least half of the workers in a particular place of work and if at least 10% 
workers employed in the sector concerned are registered with the trade union in 
question. 
The unionisation of employees in private banking is historically high and remains so. 
In July 2005, therefore, some 90% of employees in private banks were members of a 
trade union (see Table 16). For many decades, five trade unions were allowed to 
operate in the banking and insurance sectors in Turkey. The largest is BASİSEN, 
which accounts for some 44% of all employees in these sectors (as of July 2005), 
while the second largest, BANKSİS, represents around 17% of employees.20 
So far as state-owned banks are concerned, employees of these, as well as of state-
owned insurance companies, have a choice between five trade unions, though they are 
not obliged to be a member of any of them (Table 17). (This is stipulated in the Law 
on Unions of Public Employees, No. 4688, of June 2001 and the related Regulation 
published in the Official Journal in November 2001.) The two largest unions, TÜRK 
BÜRO-SEN and TÜM BANKA-SEN, each account for over 40% of all unionised 
employees (45% and 41%, respectively), while the third largest, BÜRO MEMUR-
SEN, accounts for 13%, with very few belonging to the smallest two union. The 
majority of employees in state-owned banks – just over 58% as at May 2005 – 
however, do not belong to any union. 
                                                 
20 Since banking related unions also have members working in insurance and other financial sectors, it 
is difficult to know the exact number of members who work in banks. 
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Both the developments prior to and during the 2000-2001 banking crisis and the 
observed process of restructuring of commercial banks in Turkey imply that the 
power of trade unions to influence developments in the sector was extremely limited. 
To some extent, this might be explicable in terms of their relatively poor and over-
politicised organisational structure. In addition, trade unions in state-owned banks 
have a relatively short history, which helps to explain the relatively low level of 
membership. More fundamentally, however, it is explicable in terms of the fact that, 
in general, the Government ignored the contribution of trade unions when formulating 
restructuring programmes and usually decided the contents of these alone.  
Moreover, the five trade unions representing employees of private banks had a 
negligible effect on the resolution of banks which had been transferred to SDIF 
despite their large membership. Their efforts to support their members were, in 
practice, disorganised and weak. They were, therefore, almost entirely ignored by the 
Government both prior to the announcement and during the implementation of the 
programme. 
5. Lessons to be learned from banking restructuring and resolution in Turkey 
The estimates presented above indicate that more than 73 thousand people have been 
involved in the restructuring and rehabilitation of banks since 1997 in Turkey, over 
42% of the total work force in the banking sector at the end of 1999 (Table 14 and 
Figure 7). Some 26 thousand employees have been transferred to other banks as a 
result of mergers and sales, or obliged to shift to other state institutions. Around 17.6 
thousand employees, mainly from state banks, are estimated to have retired and so 
withdrawn from the work force. This leaves around 30 thousand employees who 
became unemployed.  
At the same time, the ‘non-problem’ banks which were not involved in the 
restructuring or resolution process experienced a much smaller, if still significant 
reduction in employment during the crisis – of around 17% between the end 1998 and 
the end of 2001 – which has since been almost entirely reversed as jobs have 
expanded again (see Figure 7). 
The decline in the number of banks, branches and employees between December 1999 
and September 2005 (by 42%, 20% and 24%, respectively) and the substantial 
organisational changes which occurred were accompanied by a significant change in 
the educational composition of the work force along with a shift in employment from 
men to women. The share of university graduates among total employees increased 
from just under 44% to 65% over these five years, while 43.5 in 1999 to 64.6 in 
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2005,21 while, perhaps related to this, the share of men in total employment declined 
from 59% to 53%. The brunt of the impact of restructuring was, therefore, borne by 
those without university qualifications, mainly those with upper secondary level 
education and more by men than by women.  
The above discussion indicates that efforts to privatise state-owned banks, evolving 
crisis, and attempts at restructuring all occurred at the same time over the last 10 
years, making it difficult to distinguish between causes, effects and cures. The process 
of restructuring state-owned banks, on the one hand, and the resolution of private 
SDIF-banks, on the other, seems to have been speeded up by the deep crisis in the real 
economy, foreign exchange market and banking sector that occurred between 
November 2000 and February 2001. This process unquestionably had far-reaching 
labour market effects which, unfortunately, remain to be adequately investigated by 
economists. In part, this is a result of many aspects of the process itself being 
confidential and unclear and of a major lack of information and statistical data on the 
details of what happened. 
The dominant role of the Turkish Government in the restructuring and resolution of 
banks in the wake of severe economic crisis is itself a reason for the process not being 
transparent. Moreover, as noted above, both the employers (i.e. the ‘problem’ private 
banks) and trade unions were largely ignored prior to restructuring and during the 
process itself. The illegal activities of many private-bank managers in the 1990s 
which resulted in the transfer of their banks to SDIF for resolution is an 
understandable reason for ignoring their views and suggestions during both prior 
consultation and the restructuring process. However, the lack of involvement in the 
restructuring programme of trade unions representing bank employees is a joint 
failure of both the trade unions themselves, which have proved to be far too weak to 
protect their members’ interests, and the Government that cannot be so easily 
overlooked. 
To sum up, the Turkish case of large-scale restructuring in the banking sector 
indicates clearly that: 
• Political and macroeconomic stability prior to the implementation of a 
restructuring programme seems to be a major prerequisite for the programme 
being successful. Political instability and a relatively short election cycles together 
with high inflation are likely to make it more difficult, especially so far as banking 
                                                 
21 Although there is a lack of detailed statistics on the jobs which university graduates who work for 
banks do, it is likely that this shift is also associated with the increasing demand of banks for 
electrical, electronics and computer engineers in recent years, as a result of ongoing automation and 
restructuring of jobs within banks. 
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restructuring is concerned – but also more generally – both to undertake the 
necessary changes and to moderate their effects on the economy and employment. 
A major lesson for the banking sector as such is that an environment of excessive 
risk-taking should be avoided since it can all too easily lead to a severe systemic 
crisis. 
• Close monitoring of developments in the relevant market and the correct timing of 
government intervention are critical to keeping down the costs of restructuring in 
the broadest sense. If there is a significant delay in the restructuring being 
initiated, as seems to have been the case in Turkey, the adverse socio-economic 
effects can increase dramatically, as evidenced by the substantial number of 
banking employees affected by restructuring in Turkey once it got underway. 
• A high degree of transparency, fairness in the implementation of measures and 
impartial and consistent imposition of the rule of law are essential for the success 
– widely defined – of the restructuring process. 
• Government prior consultation with interested parties (particularly trade unions) is 
important to ensure fairness, transparency and the effectiveness of restructuring, 
as well as, in the Turkish case, of the process of privatisation. Accordingly, 
Governments should allow sufficient time between the announcement of a 
restructuring programme and the start of its implementation for the workers who 
are expected to be affected to take anticipatory action and to prepare themselves 
for facing the problems that are likely to arise.  
In the Turkish case, however, to do this was almost impossible because of the 
sudden deepening of the banking and currency crisis between November 2000 and 
February 2001. The Turkish Government and employees of state banks which 
were expecting privatisation were not prepared to have to face a problem of this 
magnitude. As could be expected, therefore, the attempt of the Government to 
implement a restructuring programme without much if any prior consultation with 
those affected worsened the social effects and heightened grievances among bank 
staff, as reflected, for example, in the large number of lawsuit cases brought 
against their former employers by employees in state banks who were transferred 
or forced to take early retirement. 
• The labour market consequences of restructuring are no less important than their 
financial costs, especially if they are concentrated in particular parts of the 
country. For example, although employment in banking represents a relatively 
small share of total employment in Turkey, it needs to be borne in mind that the 
labour market effects of the banking crisis, restructuring and resolution were 
particularly concentrated in large cities, Istanbul and Ankara especially. This in 
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turn implies that the social impact was itself concentrated and accordingly more 
significant as a result.  
The Government, however, was mainly concerned with reducing the financial 
costs of the restructuring and of the other developments which occurred at the 
same time and made little effort to prevent or moderate the problems facing the 
workers affected. 
6. Future prospects for Turkish banking 
In early October 2005, the EU decided to start accession negotiations with Turkey. 
During these negotiations, which might last ten years or more, Turkey will experience 
further significant economic and structural change, not least as the whole body of EU 
legislation and standards, the Acquis Communautaire, is applied. In December 2004, 
Mr. Rodrigo de Rato, IMF Managing Director, stated in his press release on Turkey 
(No. 04/265) that “in the banking sector, the goal over the next three years will be to 
align Turkey’s supervisory framework more closely with EU standards, accelerate 
resolution of assets held by the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund, and strengthen 
further the operations of the state banks. A key first step will be the introduction of a 
new financial services law that will upgrade rules relating to bank owners and 
managers, licensing, and related party lending, and allow the Banking Regulation and 
Supervision Agency to coordinate on-site and off-site inspection more effectively.”22 
Recent Deutsche Bank estimates, moreover, indicate that the Turkish banking sector 
stands to benefit from increasing macroeconomic stability, improving credit 
worthiness, higher economic growth, larger domestic savings and EU-related 
institutional reforms within the coming 10- 15 years and that the sector is likely to 
experience increased consolidation and foreign competition (see Jaeger, 2005). If this 
scenario is realised, the structure of the banking sector which remain under-developed 
with assets representing only 70% of GDP and loans a mere 20% may finally be 
transformed into one that can effectively support economic development and job 
creation in Turkey as has been needed for over three decades. 
                                                 
22 A review of the recent strengths and weaknesses of the banking sector are presented in the report of 
the Workinggroup for Financial Markets of BAT (2004). For a selective summary of the issues 
addressed in there, see Table 19 at the end of this study. 
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Figure 1: Banking Sector Fragility in Turkey (January 1979 – June 2005) 
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Data Source: Central Bank of Republic of Turkey, State Institute of Statistics, and the International Monetary Fund; author’s own 
calculations. Methodology: Kibritçioğlu (2003). 
Note: Turkish commercial-banking sector experienced several difficulties, as a result of their own excessive risk-taking 
behaviour within the last 25 years. Figure 1 above shows a banking sector fragility (BSF) index developed by Kibritçioğlu 
(2003). In one version, BSF3, it measures the weighted average of month-to-month real changes in bank claims on the domestic 
private sector, foreign liabilities of banks, and bank deposits, which are accepted as indicators of credit risk, exchange-rate risk 
and liquidity risk, respectively. The BSF2 version then excludes changes in bank deposits. The difference between these two 
versions shows roughly the effect of bank withdrawals, which becomes small if deposit insurance exists. Applied to Turkey, 
Figure 1 shows an excessive risk-taking behaviour prior to each of the banking crises, visible as a peak value of the BSF curve. 
Then, these periods of excessive risk-taking are followed by sharp falls in the BSF index. The periods in which the index is 
below –0.5 are entitled as “high-fragility” periods, which are depicted as grey-shaded areas in the figure. 
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Figure 2: Selected Indicators of the Commercial Banking Sector in Turkey (1961 – 2005) 
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Source: Banks Association of Turkey (BAT); author’s own calculations. 
Note: For 1961-2004, the data is as end of the year. The 2005 figures are as end of June. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Employment in the Turkish Commercial Banking Sector (1961 – 2005) 
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Source: Banks Association of Turkey (BAT); author’s own calculations. 
Note: For 1961-2004, the data is as end of the year. The 2005 figures are as end of June. 
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Figure 4: The Road towards Restructuring and Consolidation in Turkish Banking Sector (1993-2002) 
 
Source: Banks Association of Turkey (BAT) and State Deposit Insurance Fund (SDIF); adapted from McKinsey (2003: 194). 
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Figure 5: Real Annual Salaries and Employee Benefits per Employee (1961-69 = 100) 
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Source: Banks Association of Turkey (BAT); author’s own calculations. 
Note: There is no BAT data on salaries in Turkish banking for the period after 2001. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Nominal Annual Salaries and Employee Benefits per Employee (thousand USD/person) 
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Source: Banks Association of Turkey (BAT); author’s own calculations. 
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Figure 7: Restructuring and Resolution of Banks and Employment in Banking System (1997-2005) 
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Source: Banks Association of Turkey (BAT) and State Deposit Insurance Fund (SDIF); author’s own calculations. 
 31
Table 1: Number of Banks, Branches and Bank Employees in Turkey (1961-2005, as end of year) [Part I] 
1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975
Number of Banks     52     51     51     48     48     47     46     47     46     46     45     44     43     43     42
Commercial Banks     51     50     50     46     46     45     44     44     44     44     43     42     41     41     40
Privately-owned Banks     20     22     22     23     23     23     22     22     22     22     23     22     21     22     23
Local Banks     12     9     9     6     6     5     5     5     5     5     3     3     3     2     0
State-owned Banks     14     14     14     12     12     12     12     12     12     12     12     12     12     12     12
Foreign Banks     5     5     5     5     5     5     5     5     5     5     5     5     5     5     5
Banks Under the Deposit Insurance Fund     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0
Development and Investment Banks     1     1     1     2     2     2     2     3     2     2     2     2     2     2     2
Number of Branches    1 716    1 716    1 827    1 896    1 968    2 045    2 210    2 537    2 932    3 194    3 411    3 666    4 007    4 407    4 587
Commercial Banks    1 715    1 715    1 825    1 894    1 966    2 043    2 208    2 534    2 930    3 192    3 408    3 662    4 002    4 401    4 581
Privately-owned Banks     843     797     847     862     897     926    1 014    1 223    1 486    1 643    1 800    1 992    2 269    2 585    2 715
Local Banks     14     14     7     6     6     5     5     5     5     5     3     3     3     2     0
State-owned Banks     797     843     907     958     995    1 044    1 121    1 220    1 337    1 433    1 492    1 553    1 616    1 700    1 752
Foreign Banks     61     61     64     68     68     68     68     86     102     111     113     114     114     114     114
Banks Under the Deposit Insurance Fund     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0
Development and Investment Banks     1     1     2     2     2     2     2     3     2     2     3     4     5     6     6
Number of Employees    32 055    32 913    34 108    35 941    37 956    42 457    47 100    53 748    60 534    65 968    69 603    74 562    83 077    89 446    96 358
Commercial Banks    31 945    32 793    33 949    35 776    37 748    42 228    46 853    53 475    60 255    65 695    69 297    74 245    82 753    89 097    95 999
Privately-owned Banks    15 862    14 668    15 737    16 323    17 365    18 854    20 884    24 118    28 040    30 809    32 949    36 520    41 590    45 012    48 839
Local Banks     82     66     36     32     33     29     32     31     37     32     13     12     19     8     0
State-owned Banks    14 310    16 352    16 499    17 710    18 543    21 564    24 184    27 462    30 299    33 006    34 362    35 697    39 037    41 997    45 015
Foreign Banks    1 691    1 707    1 677    1 711    1 807    1 781    1 753    1 864    1 879    1 848    1 973    2 016    2 107    2 080    2 145
Banks Under the Deposit Insurance Fund     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0
Development and Investment Banks     110     120     159     165     208     229     247     273     279     273     306     317     324     349     359
Number of Employees per Branch     19     19     19     19     19     21     21     21     21     21     20     20     21     20     21
Commercial Banks     19     19     19     19     19     21     21     21     21     21     20     20     21     20     21
Privately-owned Banks     19     18     19     19     19     20     21     20     19     19     18     18     18     17     18
Local Banks     6     5     5     5     6     6     6     6     7     6     4     4     6     4
State-owned Banks     18     19     18     18     19     21     22     23     23     23     23     23     24     25     26
Foreign Banks     28     28     26     25     27     26     26     22     18     17     17     18     18     18     19
Banks Under the Deposit Insurance Fund
Development and Investment Banks     110     120     80     83     104     115     124     91     140     137     102     79     65     58     60
Number of Branches per Bank     33     34     36     40     41     44     48     54     64     69     76     83     93     102     109
Commercial Banks     34     34     37     41     43     45     50     58     67     73     79     87     98     107     115
Privately-owned Banks     42     36     39     37     39     40     46     56     68     75     78     91     108     118     118
Local Banks     1     2     1     1     1     1     1     1     1     1     1     1     1     1
State-owned Banks     57     60     65     80     83     87     93     102     111     119     124     129     135     142     146
Foreign Banks     12     12     13     14     14     14     14     17     20     22     23     23     23     23     23
Banks Under the Deposit Insurance Fund
Development and Investment Banks     1     1     2     1     1     1     1     1     1     1     2     2     3     3     3
Annual Growth in Number of Employees (%) 2.7 3.6 5.4 5.6 11.9 10.9 14.1 12.6 9.0 5.5 7.1 11.4 7.7 7.7
Commercial Banks 2.7 3.5 5.4 5.5 11.9 11.0 14.1 12.7 9.0 5.5 7.1 11.5 7.7 7.7
Privately-owned Banks -7.5 7.3 3.7 6.4 8.6 10.8 15.5 16.3 9.9 6.9 10.8 13.9 8.2 8.5
Local Banks -19.5 -45.5 -11.1 3.1 -12.1 10.3 -3.1 19.4 -13.5 -59.4 -7.7 58.3 -57.9
State-owned Banks 14.3 0.9 7.3 4.7 16.3 12.1 13.6 10.3 8.9 4.1 3.9 9.4 7.6 7.2
Foreign Banks 0.9 -1.8 2.0 5.6 -1.4 -1.6 6.3 0.8 -1.6 6.8 2.2 4.5 -1.3 3.1
Banks Under the Deposit Insurance Fund
Development and Investment Banks 9.1 32.5 3.8 26.1 10.1 7.9 10.5 2.2 -2.2 12.1 3.6 2.2 7.7 2.9  
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Table 1: Number of All Banks, Branches and Bank Employees in Turkey (1961-2005, as end of year) [Part II] 
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Number of Banks     43     43     43     43     43     45     48     45     47     50     55     56     60     62
Commercial Banks     41     41     41     41     40     42     45     42     44     47     49     50     52     53
Privately-owned Banks     23     23     24     24     24     24     24     19     19     20     24     24     25     24
Local Banks     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0
State-owned Banks     13     13     13     13     12     12     12     13     12     12     8     9     8     8
Foreign Banks     5     5     4     4     4     6     9     10     13     15     17     17     19     21
Banks Under the Deposit Insurance Fund     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0
Development and Investment Banks     2     2     2     2     3     3     3     3     3     3     6     6     8     9
Number of Branches    4 817    5 218    5 464    5 748    5 954    6 244    6 353    6 281    6 202    6 268    6 348    6 417    6 528    6 593
Commercial Banks    4 811    5 212    5 458    5 742    5 948    6 237    6 347    6 275    6 196    6 262    6 337    6 406    6 516    6 579
Privately-owned Banks    2 862    3 094    3 181    3 285    3 374    2 569    3 618    3 345    3 315    3 325    3 493    3 404    3 457    3 501
Local Banks     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0
State-owned Banks    1 835    2 009    2 173    2 353    2 469    3 545    2 602    2 817    2 764    2 817    2 727    2 898    2 953    2 972
Foreign Banks     114     109     104     104     105     123     127     113     117     120     117     104     106     106
Banks Under the Deposit Insurance Fund     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0
Development and Investment Banks     6     6     6     6     6     7     6     6     6     6     11     11     12     14
Number of Employees    104 164    113 564    119 213    122 489    125 312    126 564    131 396    133 455    134 656    138 201    143 376    148 995    151 262    153 067
Commercial Banks    103 797    113 175    118 822    122 110    124 918    126 163    130 966    133 002    134 199    137 752    141 708    147 156    149 264    151 111
Privately-owned Banks    52 731    56 680    58 091    59 216    60 596    62 152    66 055    61 203    61 438    62 886    66 783    66 045    67 724    68 041
Local Banks     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0
State-owned Banks    48 931    54 341    58 931    61 076    62 480    61 977    62 458    69 196    69 992    72 214    72 024    78 390    78 730    80 141
Foreign Banks    2 135    2 154    1 800    1 818    1 842    2 034    2 453    2 603    2 769    2 652    2 901    2 721    2 810    2 929
Banks Under the Deposit Insurance Fund     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0
Development and Investment Banks     367     389     391     379     394     401     430     453     457     449    1 668    1 839    1 998    1 956
Number of Employees per Branch     22     22     22     21     21     20     21     21     22     22     23     23     23     23
Commercial Banks     22     22     22     21     21     20     21     21     22     22     22     23     23     23
Privately-owned Banks     18     18     18     18     18     24     18     18     19     19     19     19     20     19
Local Banks
State-owned Banks     27     27     27     26     25     17     24     25     25     26     26     27     27     27
Foreign Banks     19     20     17     17     18     17     19     23     24     22     25     26     27     28
Banks Under the Deposit Insurance Fund
Development and Investment Banks     61     65     65     63     66     57     72     76     76     75     152     167     167     140
Number of Branches per Bank     112     121     127     134     138     139     132     140     132     125     115     115     109     106
Commercial Banks     117     127     133     140     149     149     141     149     141     133     129     128     125     124
Privately-owned Banks     124     135     133     137     141     107     151     176     174     166     146     142     138     146
Local Banks
State-owned Banks     141     155     167     181     206     295     217     217     230     235     341     322     369     372
Foreign Banks     23     22     26     26     26     21     14     11     9     8     7     6     6     5
Banks Under the Deposit Insurance Fund
Development and Investment Banks     3     3     3     3     2     2     2     2     2     2     2     2     2     2
Annual Growth in Number of Employees (%) 8.1 9.0 5.0 2.7 2.3 1.0 3.8 1.6 0.9 2.6 3.7 3.9 1.5 1.2
Commercial Banks 8.1 9.0 5.0 2.8 2.3 1.0 3.8 1.6 0.9 2.6 2.9 3.8 1.4 1.2
Privately-owned Banks 8.0 7.5 2.5 1.9 2.3 2.6 6.3 -7.3 0.4 2.4 6.2 -1.1 2.5 0.5
Local Banks
State-owned Banks 8.7 11.1 8.4 3.6 2.3 -0.8 0.8 10.8 1.2 3.2 -0.3 8.8 0.4 1.8
Foreign Banks -0.5 0.9 -16.4 1.0 1.3 10.4 20.6 6.1 6.4 -4.2 9.4 -6.2 3.3 4.2
Banks Under the Deposit Insurance Fund
Development and Investment Banks 2.2 6.0 0.5 -3.1 4.0 1.8 7.2 5.3 0.9 -1.8 271.5 10.3 8.6 -2.1  
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Table 1: Number of All Banks, Branches and Bank Employees in Turkey (1961-2005, as end of year) [Part III] 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 *
Number of Banks     66     65     69     70     67     68     69     72     75     81     79     61     54     50     48     48
Commercial Banks     56     55     57     58     55     55     56     59     60     62     61     46     40     36     35     35
Privately-owned Banks     25     26     31     32     29     32     33     36     38     31     28     22     20     18     18     19
Local Banks     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0 - - - - - -
State-owned Banks     8     8     6     6     6     5     5     5     4     4     4     3     3     3     3     3
Foreign Banks     23     21     20     20     20     18     18     18     18     19     18     15     15     13     13     12
Banks Under the Deposit Insurance Fund     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     8     11     6     2     2     1     1
Development and Investment Banks     10     10     12     12     12     13     13     13     15     19     18     15     14     14     13     13
Number of Branches    6 560    6 477    6 206    6 212    6 087    6 241    6 442    6 819    7 370    7 691    7 837    6 908    6 106    5 966    6 280    6 053
Commercial Banks    6 543    6 460    6 187    6 192    6 068    6 219    6 419    6 795    7 340    7 660    7 807    6 889    6 087    5 949    6 262    6 034
Privately-owned Banks    3 455    3 325    3 077    3 087    3 054    3 240    3 429    3 764    4 393    3 960    3 783    3 523    3 659    3 594    3 729    3 786
Local Banks     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0 - - - - - -
State-owned Banks    2 975    3 027    3 001    2 997    2 909    2 875    2 886    2 915    2 832    2 865    2 834    2 725    2 019    1 971    2 149    2 039
Foreign Banks     113     108     109     108     105     104     104     116     115     121     117     233     206     209     209     208
Banks Under the Deposit Insurance Fund     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     714    1 073     408     203     175     175     1
Development and Investment Banks     17     17     19     20     19     22     23     24     30     31     30     19     19     17     18     19
Number of Employees    154 089    152 901    146 823    143 983    139 046    144 793    148 153    154 864    166 492    173 988    170 401    137 495    123 271    123 249    127 163    129 887
Commercial Banks    151 982    150 780    144 570    141 725    136 879    138 694    142 046    149 618    161 189    168 558    164 845    132 274    118 329    118 607    122 630    125 416
Privately-owned Banks    68 145    66 555    63 337    62 764    59 161    63 010    68 592    76 601    86 066    76 386    70 954    64 380    66 869    70 614    76 880    79 870
Local Banks     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0 - - - - - -
State-owned Banks    80 825    81 214    78 223    76 553    74 462    72 699    70 284    69 218    71 072    72 007    70 191    56 108    40 158    37 994    39 467    39 080
Foreign Banks    3 012    3 011    3 010    2 408    3 256    2 985    3 170    3 799    4 051    4 185    3 805    5 395    5 416    5 481    5 880    6 065
Banks Under the Deposit Insurance Fund     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0    15 980    19 895    6 391    5 886    4 518     403     401
Development and Investment Banks    2 107    2 121    2 253    2 258    2 167    6 099    6 107    5 246    5 303    5 430    5 556    5 221    4 942    4 642    4 533    4 471
Number of Employees per Branch     23     24     24     23     23     23     23     23     23     23     22     20     20     21     20     21
Commercial Banks     23     23     23     23     23     22     22     22     22     22     21     19     19     20     20     21
Privately-owned Banks     20     20     21     20     19     19     20     20     20     19     19     18     18     20     21     21
Local Banks
State-owned Banks     27     27     26     26     26     25     24     24     25     25     25     21     20     19     18     19
Foreign Banks     27     28     28     22     31     29     30     33     35     35     33     23     26     26     28     29
Banks Under the Deposit Insurance Fund     22     19     16     29     26     2     401
Development and Investment Banks     124     125     119     113     114     277     266     219     177     175     185     275     260     273     252     235
Number of Branches per Bank     99     100     90     89     91     92     93     95     98     95     99     113     113     119     131     126
Commercial Banks     117     117     109     107     110     113     115     115     122     124     128     150     152     165     179     172
Privately-owned Banks     138     128     99     96     105     101     104     105     116     128     135     160     183     200     207     199
Local Banks
State-owned Banks     372     378     500     500     485     575     577     583     708     716     709     908     673     657     716     680
Foreign Banks     5     5     5     5     5     6     6     6     6     6     7     16     14     16     16     17
Banks Under the Deposit Insurance Fund     89     98     68     102     88     175     1
Development and Investment Banks     2     2     2     2     2     2     2     2     2     2     2     1     1     1     1     1
Annual Growth in Number of Employees (%) 0.7 -0.8 -4.0 -1.9 -3.4 4.1 2.3 4.5 7.5 4.5 -2.1 -19.3 -10.3 0.0 3.2 2.1
Commercial Banks 0.6 -0.8 -4.1 -2.0 -3.4 1.3 2.4 5.3 7.7 4.6 -2.2 -19.8 -10.5 0.2 3.4 2.3
Privately-owned Banks 0.2 -2.3 -4.8 -0.9 -5.7 6.5 8.9 11.7 12.4 -11.2 -7.1 -9.3 3.9 5.6 8.9 3.9
Local Banks
State-owned Banks 0.9 0.5 -3.7 -2.1 -2.7 -2.4 -3.3 -1.5 2.7 1.3 -2.5 -20.1 -28.4 -5.4 3.9 -1.0
Foreign Banks 2.8 0.0 0.0 -20.0 35.2 -8.3 6.2 19.8 6.6 3.3 -9.1 41.8 0.4 1.2 7.3 3.1
Banks Under the Deposit Insurance Fund 24.5 -67.9 -7.9 -23.2 -91.1 -0.5
Development and Investment Banks 7.7 0.7 6.2 0.2 -4.0 181.4 0.1 -14.1 1.1 2.4 2.3 -6.0 -5.3 -6.1 -2.3 -1.4  
Source: Banks Association of Turkey (BAT) and author’s own calculations. 
* As end of June 2005. 
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Table 2: The Estimated Cost of the 2000-2001 Banking Crisis 
  in USD 
billion 
as percent 
of GDP 
Total Cost to the Treasury 43.7 29.5 
Restructuring of State-owned Banks 21.9 14.8 
Duty Losses 19.0 12.8 
Recapitalization 2.9 2.0 
For Private Banks Transferred to SDIF 21.8 14.7 
Total Cost to the Private Sector 9.5 6.4 
Cost borne by the SDIF 6.7 4.5 
Capital Injection by Shareholders 2.8 1.9 
Total Cost of the Banking Crisis 53.2 35.9 
Source: BRSA (2003) and Steinherr, et al. (2004).
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Table 3: Activities of the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (SDIF), Part I 
Banks 
Established 
in 
Date of 
Transfer to 
the SDIF 
Current Status 
Banks Merged 
Interbank 1888 January 7, 1999 
Established with the name of Selanik Bankası T.A.Ş. which had foreign capital. The name 
was changed as Uluslararası End. ve Tic. Bankası in 1969 and the statue was changed in 
1978. The name was changed again in 1990 as Interbank. Merged with Etibank bank on 
April 15, 2001. 
Esbank 1927 December 21, 1999 Merged with Etibank bank on April 15, 2001. 
Egebank 1928 December 21, 1999 Merged with Sümerbank on January 26, 2001. 
Yurtbank 1993 December 21, 1999 
Established with the name of Eurocredit Türk Fransız Ticaret Bankası A.Ş., the name was 
changed in 1994. Merged with Sümerbank on January 26, 2001. 
Yaşarbank 1924 December 21, 1999 
Established as T. Tütüncüler Bankası A.Ş., the name was changed in 1996. Merged with 
Sümerbank on January 26, 2001. 
Bank 
Kapital 1986 
October 27, 
2000 
Refining with Bank Indosuez Generale Euro Türk A.Ş. which was established with foreign 
capital in 1986, the bank had the name of Kapital Bank Türk A.Ş. in 1991 and in 1995 the 
statue was changed. Merged with Sümerbank on January 26, 2001. 
Ulusalbank 1985 February 28, 2001 
Established as Saudi American Bank, the name changed in 1997. Merged with Sümerbank 
on April 17, 2001. 
Iktisat 
Bankası 1927 
March 15, 
2001 
Established as a local bank with the name of Denizli İktisat Bankası. It’s statue and name 
were changed in 1971and in 1980 respectively. Banking and deposit taking license was 
revoked as of December 7, 2001 and the liquidation process initiated. Upon the resolution 
adopted in the General Assembly Meeting on April 04, 2002 the liquidation decision was 
revoked and the Bank was merged under Bayındırbank. 
EGS Bank 1995 July 9, 2001 
Established with the name of Ege Giyim Sanayicileri Yatırım Bank A.Ş., the name and the 
statue were changed in 1997. Banking and deposit taking license was revoked as of January 
18, 2002 and merged into Bayındırbank as of the same date. 
Kentbank 1992 July 9, 2001 
Banking and deposit taking license was revoked as of December 28, 2001 and the 
liquidation process initiated. Upon the resolution adopted in the General Assembly Meeting 
on March 20, 2002 the liquidation decision was revoked and the Bank was merged into 
Bayındırbank. 
Etibank 1935 October 27, 2001 
Established with state-owned capital, privatised in 1997. Banking and deposit taking license 
was revoked as of December 28, 2001 and the liquidation process initiated. Upon the 
resolution adopted in the General Assembly Meeting on March 20, 2002 the liquidation 
decision was revoked and the Bank was merged into Bayındırbank. 
Toprakbank 1992 November 30,2001 
Banking and deposit taking license of the bank was revoked as of September 30, 2002 and 
merged into Bayındırbank as of the same date. 
Pamukbank 1955 June 19, 2002 
In accordance with the “ The transfer of Pamukbank Türk Anonim Şirketi to Türkiye Halk 
Bankası Anonim Şirketi and the Act Concerning Making Changes in Some Acts” Nr. 5230, 
was transferred to Türkiye Halk Bankasý A.Ş on November 12, 2004. 
Banks Sold 
Bank 
Ekspres 1989 
December 12, 
1998 
Sold to the Tekfen Holding on June 30, 2001. The transfer was approved by the BRSA on 
October 26, 2001. Operating as Tekfenbank A.Ş. 
Sümerbank 1933 December 21, 1999 
Established with state-owned capital and privatised in 1995. Merged Sümerbank was sold to 
the OYAK Group on August 9, 2001. Merger of Sümerbank and Oyakbank was approved 
on January 11, 2002. Operating as Oyakbank. 
Demirbank 1953 December 6, 2000 
Sold to HSBC on September 20, 2001. Approval of the transfer was made on October 30, 
2001. 
Sitebank 1991 July 9, 2001 
Established with the name of Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company which was owned by 
foreign capital in 1984 and changed it’s name as Chemical Bank in 1991. It had the name of 
Sitebank A.Ş. in 1997 with a change in it’s statue. A share transfer agreement was signed 
with Greek Novabank on December 20, 2001. The transfer procedure was carried out on 
January 25, 2002. In early 2003 it’s name changed to BankEuropa. 
Tarişbank 1914 July 9, 2001 
Established as Milli Aydın Bankası A.Ş. The share transfer agreement regarding the 
acquisition by Denizbank A.S. was signed on October 21, 2002. Actual share transfer was 
completed as of October 25, 2002. The merger of Tarişbank with Denizbank A.Ş. was 
approved by the BRSA on December 19, 2002 and merger was finalised on December 27, 
2003. 
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Table 3: Activities of the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (SDIF), Part II 
Banks 
Established 
in 
Date of 
Transfer to 
the SDIF 
Current Status 
Banks under Liquidation Process (within the Scope of Article 18 of the Banks Act) 
Türkbank 1914 November 6, 1997 * 
Esatblished as Türk Ticaret Bankası A.Ş. Pursuant to the resolution dated June 15, 2001 Nr. 
346 of the BRSA, license of Türkbank to perform banking activities and accept deposits 
were revoked upon decision dated July 1, 2001 and within the scope of the Articles 
concerning dissolution and transfer of the Turkish Code and the Article 18 of the Banks 
Act and the articles of association of the Bank master agreement, the transfer of the bank 
was decided to be realised. Upon the Resolution dated August 9, 2002 of the Extraordinary 
General Meeting and registered on August 14, 2002, the transfer transactions of the bank 
are continuing. 
Banks Management and Control Transferred to SDIF (within the Scope of Article 16 of the Banks Act) 
İmar Bankası 1928 July 3, 2003 
License of Imar Bank to perform banking activities and accept deposits were revoked upon 
the decision Nr: 1085 dated July 03, 2003 of the Banking Regulation and Supervision 
Board, pursuant to Article 14 /3 of the Banks’ Act Nr. 4389 and the management and 
control hereof was transferred to the SDIF. Liquidation proceedings have not been initiated 
yet. 
Banks Remaining under SDIF 
Bayındırbank 1958 July 09, 2001 
Çaybank A.Ş. was established as a local bank. The statue changed in 1964. The name 
changed was as Derbank in 1991 and as Bayındırbank in 1998. It is being restructured as a 
bridge bank which will perform asset management function. 
Source: State Deposit Insurance Fund (SDIF) (2005), Annual Report 2004, İstanbul, May, and Banks Association of Turkey (BAT), İstanbul. 
* The majority holdings of the Bank taken up by the SDIF.
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Table 4: Structural Characteristics of the Turkish Commercial Banking Sector (1990-2005, as of end of year) * 
 
Years 
Total 
Number 
of Banks
Total 
Number of 
Branches 
Total 
Number of 
Employees 
Employees 
per Bank 
Total Assets
(billion $) 
Total Loans
(billion $) 
Total 
Deposits 
(billion $)
Deposits 
per  
Employee
(billion $) 
Loans / 
Assets 
Securities / 
Assets 
Foreign 
Bank 
Borrowing 
/ Deposits
Memo 
Item: 
GDP 
(billion $) 
1990 56 5112 117618 2100 51.1 23.3 31.7 0.0003 0.46 0.11 0.08 150.7 
1991 55 5060 116412 2117 52.4 22.2 32.2 0.0003 0.42 0.13 0.09 151.0 
1992 57 4906 112722 1978 60.0 23.8 35.7 0.0003 0.40 0.12 0.15 159.1 
1993 58 4931 111496 1922 67.3 26.8 37.7 0.0003 0.40 0.12 0.21 180.4 
1994 55 4846 107693 1958 48.3 18.0 33.2 0.0003 0.37 0.12 0.06 130.7 
1995 55 4586 109097 1887 62.2 25.4 43.6 0.0004 0.41 0.11 0.05 169.3 
1996 56 4681 109921 1862 78.3 32.3 57.2 0.0005 0.41 0.16 0.08 181.5 
1997 59 4859 114625 1837 89.6 39.5 61.3 0.0005 0.44 0.14 0.11 189.9 
1998 60 5178 121752 1910 112.2 41.2 77.3 0.0006 0.37 0.15 0.10 200.3 
1999 62 5399 126683 1926 127.2 36.0 89.4 0.0007 0.28 0.18 0.12 184.9 
2000 61 5485 125914 1942 148.3 46.2 101.9 0.0008 0.31 0.12 0.15 199.3 
2001 46 5995 124435 2552 112.0 22.1 81.0 0.0007 0.20 0.08 0.12 145.6 
2002 40 5720 118329 2793 124.3 30.8 87.1 0.0007 0.25 0.10 0.09 184.2 
2003 36 5949 118607 3182 171.6 45.4 102.01 0.0007 0.26 0.12 0.10 239.7 
2004 35 6088 122630 3504 220.9 77.3 147.7 0.0012 0.35 0.06 0.12 300.3 
2005 35 6034 125416 3583 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
 
Source: Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (BRSA), Banks Association of Turkey (BAT), and IMF, International Financial Statistics, August 2005, CD-ROM version. 
* The figures for 2005 are as end of June. 
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Table 5: Concentration in Turkish Commercial Banking (1990-2004) 
 
 Concentration Ratio for 5 Largest Banks Concentration Ratio for 10 Largest Banks 
Years Assets Deposits Credits Assets Deposits Credits 
1990 54 59 57 75 85 78 
1991 n.a. 56 n.a. n.a. 83 n.a. 
1992 n.a. 57 n.a. n.a. 82 n.a. 
1993 50 52 53 71 76 75 
1994 50 56 48 73 82 76 
1995 48 53 50 71 73 75 
1996 46 52 46 69 72 72 
1997 44 47 46 67 70 72 
1998 44 49 40 68 73 73 
1999 46 50 42 68 69 73 
2000 48 51 42 69 72 71 
2001 56 55 49 80 81 80 
2002 58 61 55 81 86 74 
2003 60 62 54 82 86 75 
2004 60 64 48 84 88 77 
 
Source: Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (BRSA) and Banks Association of Turkey (BAT). 
Note: The higher (lower) the figures in the table are, the lower (higher) is the level of competition in the sector. 
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Table 6: Distribution of Bank Employees (1995-2005, persons)1 
Dec. 1995 Dec. 1996 Dec. 1997 Dec. 1998 Dec. 1999 Dec. 2000 Dec. 2001 Dec. 2002 Dec. 2003 Dec. 2004 March 2005
June 
2005 Established in
Commercial Banks 103,807 104,247 108,401 114,604 119,436 118,479 117,372 111,720 114,565 122,630 123,767 125,416
  State-owned Banks 59,419 57,684 57,165 60,469 61,730 60,191 56,108 40,158 37,994 39,467 39,214 39,080
  Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Ziraat Bankası A.Ş. 35,962 34,566 33,343 36,460 37,705 36,576 33,023 23,330 22,138 21,172 21,053 21,037 1863
  Türkiye Halk Bankası A.Ş. 14,702 14,285 14,447 14,559 14,843 15,025 14,956 9,228 8,515 11,145 10,981 10,841 1938
  Türkiye Vakıflar Bankası T.A.O. 8,755 8,833 9,375 9,450 9,182 8,590 8,129 7,600 7,341 7,150 7,180 7,202 1954
  Privately-owned Banks 43,215 45,271 49,748 52,219 55,413 55,850 55,490 65,389 70,688 76,950 78,279 79,870
  Adabank A.Ş. 274 401 467 591 522 537 511 516 500 308 274 206 1985
  Ak Uluslararası Bankası A.Ş.2 79 80 82 90 102 109 106 105 74 70 64 17 1985
  Akbank T.A.Ş. 7,209 7,308 7,620 7,911 8,383 8,244 8,403 9,011 9,964 10,413 10,401 10,938 1948
  Alternatif Bank A.Ş. 261 336 413 654 678 738 635 486 482 547 551 568 1992
  Anadolubank A.Ş. 0 0 66 213 356 742 688 826 983 1,036 1,129 1,164 1997
  Denizbank A.Ş.3 0 0 324 584 714 956 949 2,860 3,240 4,344 4,482 4,629 1997
  Finans Bank A.Ş. 498 630 989 1,536 2,029 2,324 2,070 2,811 3,923 5,464 5,751 5,951 1987
  Koçbank A.Ş.4 1,447 1,978 2,096 2,362 2,434 2,460 2,830 3,257 3,254 3,611 3,861 3,705 1986
  MNG Bank A.Ş.5 139 139 150 319 408 332 147 179 208 226 240 263 1992
  Oyak Bank A.Ş.6 136 201 245 362 400 386 569 3,590 3,919 4,199 4,321 4,356 1996
  Şekerbank T.A.Ş. 3,393 3,365 3,241 3,188 3,158 3,029 2,614 2,948 3,000 3,334 3,427 3,455 1954
  Tekfenbank A.Ş.7 396 429 517 667 653 629 618 654 563 578 565 546 1992
  Tekstil Bankası A.Ş. 552 725 823 955 1,012 1,033 649 840 908 938 975 1,025 1986
  Turkish Bank A.Ş.8 265 257 248 251 226 200 187 183 180 188 189 199 1991
  Türk Dış Ticaret Bankası A.Ş. (Dışbank)9 839 931 1,309 1,384 1,627 1,586 2,056 2,735 3,404 3,843 3,871 3,907 1964
  Türk Ekonomi Bankası A.Ş.10 584 865 1,061 1,275 1,405 1,358 1,262 1,673 1,849 2,131 2,180 2,346 1927
  Türkiye Garanti Bankası A.Ş. 3,890 4,208 5,179 5,383 5,350 4,728 5,981 7,407 8,145 9,128 9,483 9,902 1946
  Türkiye İş Bankası A.Ş. 14,858 14,137 15,001 14,827 15,867 16,133 15,541 14,873 15,550 16,055 16,092 16,332 1924
  Yapı ve Kredi Bankası A.Ş. 8,395 9,281 9,917 9,667 10,089 10,326 9,674 10,435 10,542 10,537 10,423 10,361 1944
  Foreign Banks 1,070 1,174 1,374 1,529 1,808 1,952 5,360 5,261 5,405 5,810 5,869 6,065
  Abn Amro Bank N.V. 82 86 91 106 125 145 127 117 125 128 126 125 1921
  Arap Türk Bankası A.Ş. 202 206 247 251 252 197 172 177 175 186 187 174 1977
  Banca di Roma S.P.A. 81 69 66 45 42 42 40 31 29 30 28 28 1911
  Bank Mellat 52 53 50 49 49 43 42 39 40 47 48 50 1982
  BankEuropa Bankası A.Ş. 64 43 178 302 343 320 146 97 200 215 219 231 n.a.
  Citibank A.Ş. 281 370 414 454 679 849 951 1,064 1,167 1,351 1,417 1,469 1981
  Deutsche Bank A.Ş.11 36 35 27 28 25 34 32 29 30 36 39 41 1988
  Habib Bank Limited 17 19 15 14 10 13 14 14 14 15 15 16 1983
  HSBC Bank A.Ş.12 51 56 46 47 67 110 3,645 3,525 3,477 3,652 3,641 3,787 1990
  JPMorgan Chase Bank13 65 83 83 75 58 58 54 43 35 36 37 36 1984
  Société Générale (SA) 44 50 53 58 58 54 53 50 49 54 56 54 1990
  WestLB AG14 95 104 104 100 100 87 84 75 64 60 56 54 1986
  Banks Under the Deposit Insurance Fund 103 118 114 387 485 486 414 912 478 403 405 401
  Bayındırbank A.Ş.15 103 118 114 387 485 486 414 912 478 403 405 401 1958
Non-depository Banks 5,719 5,838 4,995 5,026 5,142 5,285 5,079 4,913 4,612 4,533 4,504 4,471
  C Kredi ve Kalkınma Bankası A.Ş. 0 0 0 0 32 28 26 24 44 46 50 48 n.a.
  Calyon Bank Türk A.Ş. 39 27 27 28 28 30 30 30 29 39 38 38 n.a.
  Çalık Yatırım Bankası A.Ş. 0 0 0 0 15 18 22 24 26 31 29 31 1999
  Diler Yatırım Bankası A.Ş. 0 0 0 13 18 17 19 20 20 20 17 19 1998
  GSD Yatırım Bankası A.Ş. 0 0 0 0 28 35 26 30 30 28 28 27 1999
  İller Bankası16 3,927 3,840 3,126 3,070 3,062 3,202 3,110 3,004 2,764 2,718 2,676 2,662 1933
  İMKB Takas ve Saklama Bankası A.Ş. 0 242 206 220 235 243 233 230 225 231 228 225 n.a.
  Nurol Yatırım Bankası A.Ş. 0 0 0 0 53 61 46 50 49 46 46 45 1999
  Taib Yatırım Bank A.Ş.17 63 73 33 26 14 15 15 18 18 13 9 9 1988
  Tat Yatırım Bankası A.Ş. 17 16 7 10 8 9 13 11 12 11 11 11 1992
  Türk Eximbank18 363 347 341 366 366 364 373 370 356 342 364 360 1987
  Türkiye Kalkınma Bankası A.Ş.19 955 923 890 905 908 890 839 800 762 740 733 725 1975
  Türkiye Sınai Kalkınma Bankası A.Ş.20 355 370 365 388 375 373 327 302 277 268 275 271 1950
Total 109,526 110,085 113,396 119,630 124,578 123,764 122,451 116,633 119,177 127,163 128,271 129,887
Number of Employees of Closed Banks21 35,267 38,068 41,468 46,862 49,410 46,637 15,044 6,638 4,072 0 0 0
Sector Total 144,793 148,153 154,864 166,492 173,988 170,401 137,495 123,271 123,249 127,163 128,271 129,887  
Source: Banks Association of Turkey (BAT). 
1 Banks are grouped as of June 30, 2005. 
2 Bnp-Ak Dresdner Bank A.Ş. was transferred to “Privately-owned Commercial Banks” group on March 9, 2005, and the name 
of the bank was changed to “Ak Uluslararası Bankası A.Ş.” on March 30, 2005. 
3 The bank which was had state-owned capital was established with the name of Denizcilik Bankası in 1952, joining with 
Emlak Kredi Bankası in 1992, it was privatised in 1997. 
4 Bank Express I.B.C.,which was established with foreign capital in 1981 and refined in 1985, changed it's name as Koç 
Amerikan Bank A.Ş. in 1986. The name was changed as Koçbank in 1992. 
5 Established with the name of Tasarruf ve Kredi Bankası. The name was changed as Garanti Yatırım ve Ticaret Bankası A.Ş. 
in 1993. It's name was MNG Bank in 1997. 
6 Established with the name of The First National Bank of Boston A.Ş. which was owned by foreign capital in 1984. The name 
was changed as Türk Boston Bank A.Ş. in 1991 with a change in it's statue. It had the name of Oyakbank in 1996. 
7 It was taken under the Deposit Insurance Fund in 1998 with the business title Bank Ekspres A.Ş. It was sold to Tekfenbank 
A.Ş in June 2001 and its name was changed as Tekfenbank A.Ş. 
8 The name changed in 1991 while it had established as Türk Bankası Ltd. in 1982.It began to be classified as privately owned 
commercial bank in 1998. 
9 Established with the name of Amerikan-Türk Dış Ticaret Bankası A.Ş., changed the name in 1970, in 1987 the name was 
changed as Dışbank. 
10 Established with the name of Kocaeli Bankası T.A.Ş. as a local bank. Changed it's statue in 1962 and it's name in 1982. 
11 Established as Türk Merchant Bank A.Ş., the name changed as Bankers Trust in 1997, and as Deutsche Bank in 1999. 
12 Established as Midland Bank A.Ş, its name was changed in 1999 as HSBC Bank A.Ş.  
13 Its name was changed in December 2001 as JP Morgan & Chase Bank.  
14 Established as Standard Chartered Bank, the name changed in 1990. 
15 Çaybank A.Ş. was established as a local bank. The statue changed in 1964. The name changed was as Derbank in 1991 and as 
Bayındırbank in 1998. It was taken under the Deposit Insurance Fund in July 2001. 
16 Established with state-owned capital, the statue changed in 1986. 
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17 Established as Yatırım Bank A.Ş., its name was changed in 1997. 
18 Established in 1964 with the name of Devlet Yatırım Bankası which was owned by state-owned capital, the statue changed in 
1986.  
19 The name of DESİYAB, which was established with state-owned capital and changed its statue in 1986 was changed.  
20 Established with privately-owned capital, its statue was changed in 1964. 
21 Figure for 1995 includes the number of employees of banks that have been closed before that year. 
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Table 7: Distribution of Bank Branches (1995-2005) 
Dec. 
1995
Dec. 
1996
Dec. 
1997
Dec. 
1998
Dec. 
1999
Dec. 
2000
Dec. 
2001
Dec. 
2002
Dec. 
2003
Dec. 
2004
March 
2005
June 
2005 Established in
Commercial Banks 4,586 4,681 4,859 5,178 5,399 5,485 5,995 5,720 5,777 6,088 6,012 6,034
 State-owned Banks 2,349 2,354 2,382 2,426 2,459 2,429 2,725 2,019 1,971 2,149 2,038 2,039
Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Ziraat Bankası                          1,262 1,262 1,267 1,285 1,309 1,303 1,504 1,173 1,148 1,146 1,146 1,146 1863
Türkiye Halk Bankası A.Ş.                                   761 765 784 804 810 807 899 546 527 707 595 595 1938
Türkiye Vakıflar Bankası T.A.O.                             326 327 331 337 340 319 322 300 296 296 297 298 1954
 Privately-owned Banks 2,212 2,300 2,440 2,697 2,869 2,977 3,021 3,490 3,595 3,730 3,765 3,786
Adabank A.Ş.                                                40 50 60 72 82 82 82 82 82 40 30 5 1985
Ak Uluslararası Bankası A.Ş.** 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1985
Akbank T.A.Ş.                                               482 489 507 536 574 596 613 626 619 641 647 646 1948
Alternatif Bank A.Ş.                                        7 8 14 26 26 27 27 23 22 23 23 24 1992
Anadolubank A.Ş. 0 0 3 14 23 46 45 48 50 50 50 58 1997
Denizbank A.Ş. 0 0 13 29 33 47 55 161 165 199 197 205 1997
Finans Bank A.Ş.                                             13 24 40 65 106 109 108 126 150 170 174 184 1987
Koçbank A.Ş.                                                33 43 56 67 81 88 106 134 143 159 170 170 1986
MNG Bank A.Ş.                     2 1 7 15 21 21 7 6 7 8 8 10 1992
Oyak Bank A.Ş. 4 6 8 9 12 12 14 221 272 293 300 300 1996
Şekerbank T.A.Ş.                                            190 204 208 209 193 182 174 196 197 197 200 201 1954
Tekfenbank A.Ş.                                           12 14 18 26 27 26 26 33 31 31 31 30 1992
Tekstil Bankası A.Ş.                                        15 20 24 26 28 28 23 35 38 38 38 38 1986
Turkish Bank A.Ş.                                           14 14 15 15 15 14 14 13 12 13 13 14 1991
Türk Dış Ticaret Bankası A.Ş.                               22 32 50 60 84 101 117 147 158 171 172 173 1964
Türk Ekonomi Bankası A.Ş.                                   14 26 33 36 46 54 54 75 78 88 91 98 1927
Türkiye Garanti Bankası A.Ş.                                169 171 181 226 234 266 295 304 313 349 360 360 1946
Türkiye İş Bankası A.Ş.                                     819 822 823 838 851 851 841 839 844 852 855 864 1924
Yapı ve Kredi Bankası A.Ş.                                  374 374 378 426 431 425 418 419 413 407 405 405 1944
  Foreign Banks 21 21 31 38 44 52 233 202 208 208 208 208
Abn Amro Bank N.V.                                          1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1921
Arap Türk Bankası A.Ş.                                      4 4 6 6 6 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 1977
Banca di Roma S.P.A.                                        2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1911
Bank Mellat                                                 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 1982
BankEuropa Bankası A.Ş. 2 1 7 12 15 16 5 2 12 12 12 12 n.a.
Citibank A.Ş.                                              3 4 5 7 10 14 18 24 24 24 24 24 1981
Deutsche Bank A.Ş. 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1988
Habib Bank Limited                                 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1983
HSBC Bank A.Ş.                                           1 1 1 1 1 7 196 163 159 159 159 159 1990
JPMorgan Chase Bank  1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1984
Société Générale (SA)                                       1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1990
WestLB AG 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1986
  Banks Under the Deposit Insurance Fund 4 6 6 17 27 27 16 9 3 1 1 1
Bayındırbank A.Ş.                                                4 6 6 17 27 27 16 9 3 1 1 1 1958
Non-depository Banks 17 18 19 22 24 24 17 18 16 18 19 19
C Kredi ve Kalkınma Bankası A.Ş. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 n.a.
Calyon Bank Türk A.Ş. 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 n.a.
Çalık Yatırım Bankası A.Ş. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1999
Diler Yatırım Bankası A.Ş. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1998
GSD Yatırım Bankası A.Ş. 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1999
İller Bankası 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1933
İMKB Takas ve Saklama Bankası A.Ş. 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 n.a.
Nurol Yatırım Bankası A.Ş. 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 1999
Taib Yatırımbank A.Ş. 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1988
Tat Yatırım Bankası A.Ş. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1992
Türk Eximbank 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 1987
Türkiye Kalkınma Bankası A.Ş. 5 5 6 8 8 7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1975
Türkiye Sınai Kalkınma Bankası A.Ş. 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 1 1 2 2 1950
Total 4,603 4,699 4,878 5,200 5,423 5,509 6,012 5,738 5,793 6,106 6,031 6,053
Number of Branches of Closed Banks*** 1,637 1,743 1,941 2,170 2,268 2,328 896 368 173 0 0 0
Sector Total 6,240 6,442 6,819 7,370 7,691 7,837 6,908 6,106 5,966 6,106 6,031 6,053  
Source: Banks Association of Turkey (BAT). 
* Banks are grouped as of June 30, 2005. 
** Bnp-Ak Dresdner Bank A.Ş. was transferred to “Privately-owned Commercial Banks” group on March 9, 2005, and the name 
of the bank was changed to “Ak Uluslararası Bankası A.Ş.” on March 30, 2005. 
*** Figure for 1995 includes the number of employees of banks that have been closed before that year. 
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Table 8: Distribution of Bank Employees by Gender and Education (1997-2005, persons), Part I 
Banks Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total
Sector Total    5 774     426    6 198    58 204    31 544    89 733    28 259    27 969    56 215    1 443    1 245    2 679    93 680    61 184    154 864
Commercial Banks    5 546     400    5 946    57 120    31 031    88 151    26 375    26 893    53 268    1 181    1 072    2 253    90 222    59 396    149 618
State-owned Banks    2 736     249    2 985    33 088    14 556    47 644    10 365    7 564    17 929     369     291     660    46 558    22 660    69 218
Privately-owned Banks    2 649     140    2 789    23 296    15 913    39 209    15 252    18 059    33 311     672     620    1 292    41 869    34 732    76 601
Foreign Banks     161     11     172     736     562    1 298     758    1 270    2 028     140     161     301    1 795    2 004    3 799
Banks Under the Deposits Insurance Fund     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0
Non-depository Banks (Dev. & Inv. Banks)     228     26     252    1 084     513    1 582    1 884    1 076    2 947     262     173     426    3 458    1 788    5 246
Sector Total    5 166     475    5 641    60 294    32 910    93 204    28 383    28 802    57 185    5 050    5 412    10 462    98 893    67 599    166 492
Commercial Banks    4 964     448    5 412    59 207    32 402    91 609    26 496    27 670    54 166    4 768    5 234    10 002    95 435    65 754    161 189
State-owned Banks    2 604     144    2 748    33 967    14 313    48 280    10 122    6 954    17 076    1 764    1 204    2 968    48 457    22 615    71 072
Privately-owned Banks    2 226     297    2 523    24 540    17 586    42 126    15 526    19 193    34 719    2 839    3 859    6 698    45 131    40 935    86 066
Foreign Banks     134     7     141     700     503    1 203     848    1 523    2 371     165     171     336    1 847    2 204    4 051
Banks Under the Deposits Insurance Fund     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0
Non-depository Banks (Dev. & Inv. Banks)     202     27     229    1 087     508    1 595    1 887    1 132    3 019     282     178     460    3 458    1 845    5 303
Sector Total    5 047     292    5 339    59 669    33 230    92 899    35 236    37 231    72 467    1 781    1 502    3 283    101 733    72 255    173 988
Commercial Banks    4 840     261    5 101    58 566    32 710    91 276    33 314    36 052    69 366    1 492    1 323    2 815    98 212    70 346    168 558
State-owned Banks    2 392     116    2 508    33 398    13 983    47 381    12 833    8 597    21 430     392     296     688    49 015    22 992    72 007
Privately-owned Banks    1 969     110    2 079    20 340    14 518    34 858    16 349    21 588    37 937     788     724    1 512    39 446    36 940    76 386
Foreign Banks     106     5     111     668     491    1 159     889    1 671    2 560     186     169     355    1 849    2 336    4 185
Banks Under the Deposits Insurance Fund     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0     0
Non-depository Banks (Dev. & Inv. Banks)     207     31     238    1 103     520    1 623    1 922    1 179    3 101     289     179     468    3 521    1 909    5 430
Sector Total    3 533     249    3 782    56 715    28 957    85 672    37 699    39 938    77 637    1 797    1 513    3 310    99 744    70 657    170 401
Commercial Banks    3 343     220    3 563    55 612    28 447    84 059    35 659    38 710    74 369    1 525    1 329    2 854    96 139    68 706    164 845
State-owned Banks    1 470     103    1 573    30 999    10 935    41 934    14 728    11 163    25 891     452     341     793    47 649    22 542    70 191
Privately-owned Banks    1 364     65    1 429    19 019    13 171    32 190    15 602    20 292    35 894     756     685    1 441    36 741    34 213    70 954
Foreign Banks     76     6     82     551     439     990     913    1 516    2 429     159     145     304    1 699    2 106    3 805
Banks Under the Deposits Insurance Fund     433     46     479    5 043    3 902    8 945    4 416    5 739    10 155     158     158     316    10 050    9 845    19 895
Non-depository Banks (Dev. & Inv. Banks)     190     29     219    1 103     510    1 613    2 040    1 228    3 268     272     184     456    3 605    1 951    5 556
Sector Total    2 151     160    2 311    43 371    21 059    64 430    32 516    34 040    66 556    1 541    1 297    2 838    79 579    56 556    137 495
Commercial Banks    1 999     139    2 138    42 325    20 637    62 962    30 512    32 844    63 356    1 311    1 147    2 458    76 147    54 767    132 274
State-owned Banks     835     58     893    23 718    7 650    31 368    13 458    9 605    23 063     430     354     784    38 441    17 667    56 108
Privately-owned Banks     954     67    1 021    15 885    11 107    26 992    14 756    20 231    34 987     729     651    1 380    32 324    32 056    64 380
Foreign Banks     142     5     147    1 840    1 266    3 106    1 227    1 421    2 648     46     35     81    3 255    2 727    6 391
Banks Under the Deposits Insurance Fund     68     9     77     882     614    1 496    1 071    1 587    2 658     106     107     213    2 127    2 317    5 395
Non-depository Banks (Dev. & Inv. Banks)     152     21     173    1 046     422    1 468    2 004    1 196    3 200     230     150     380    3 432    1 789    5 221
TotalPrimary School High School Undergraduate Masters or PhDas of
Dec. 31, 
2001
Dec. 31, 
2000
Dec. 31, 
1999
Dec. 31, 
1997
Dec. 31, 
1998
 
Source: Banks Association of Turkey (BAT). 
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Table 8: Distribution of Bank Employees by Gender and Education (1997-2005, persons), Part II 
Banks Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total
Sector Total    1 502     158    1 660    34 792    17 611    52 403    30 996    34 902    65 898    1 787    1 523    3 310    69 077    54 194    123 271
Commercial Banks    1 383     137    1 520    33 806    17 242    51 048    29 095    33 749    62 844    1 546    1 371    2 917    65 830    52 499    118 329
State-owned Banks     404     16     420    16 216    5 318    21 534    10 189    7 406    17 595     335     274     609    27 144    13 014    40 158
Privately-owned Banks     846     112     958    15 465    10 491    25 956    15 950    22 319    38 269     895     791    1 686    33 156    33 713    66 869
Foreign Banks     70     7     77     908     608    1 516    1 368    2 029    3 397     216     210     426    2 562    2 854    5 416
Banks Under the Deposits Insurance Fund     63     2     65    1 217     825    2 042    1 588    1 995    3 583     100     96     196    2 968    2 918    5 886
Non-depository Banks (Dev. & Inv. Banks)     119     21     140     986     369    1 355    1 901    1 153    3 054     241     152     393    3 247    1 695    4 942
Sector Total    1 895     142    2 037    31 670    15 982    47 652    32 567    37 685    70 252    1 776    1 532    3 308    67 908    55 341    123 249
Commercial Banks    1 807     124    1 931    30 753    15 646    46 399    30 757    36 601    67 358    1 543    1 376    2 919    64 860    53 747    118 607
State-owned Banks     344     14     358    14 714    4 699    19 413    10 204    7 448    17 652     326     245     571    25 588    12 406    37 994
Privately-owned Banks    1 362     101    1 463    14 179    9 719    23 898    18 013    25 396    43 409     963     881    1 844    34 517    36 097    70 614
Foreign Banks     70     7     77     900     592    1 492    1 381    2 177    3 558     182     172     354    2 533    2 948    5 481
Banks Under the Deposits Insurance Fund     31     2     33     960     636    1 596    1 159    1 580    2 739     72     78     150    2 222    2 296    4 518
Non-depository Banks (Dev. & Inv. Banks)     88     18     106     917     336    1 253    1 810    1 084    2 894     233     156     389    3 048    1 594    4 642
Sector Total    1 721     182    1 903    30 474    15 756    46 230    34 436    40 918    75 354    1 935    1 741    3 676    68 566    58 597    127 163
Commercial Banks    1 639     167    1 806    29 584    15 449    45 033    32 661    39 839    72 500    1 709    1 582    3 291    65 593    57 037    122 630
State-owned Banks     318     12     330    14 146    4 665    18 811    10 969    8 594    19 563     410     353     763    25 843    13 624    39 467
Privately-owned Banks    1 220     144    1 364    14 477    10 139    24 616    20 100    28 661    48 761    1 096    1 043    2 139    36 893    39 987    76 880
Foreign Banks     92     9     101     833     561    1 394    1 499    2 503    4 002     199     184     383    2 623    3 257    5 880
Banks Under the Deposits Insurance Fund     9     2     11     128     84     212     93     81     174     4     2     6     234     169     403
Non-depository Banks (Dev. & Inv. Banks)     82     15     97     890     307    1 197    1 775    1 079    2 854     226     159     385    2 973    1 560    4 533
Sector Total    1 840     180    2 020    29 519    15 597    45 116    36 118    42 713    78 831    2 079    1 841    3 920    69 556    60 331    129 887
Commercial Banks    1 762     166    1 928    28 658    15 295    43 953    34 359    41 648    76 007    1 849    1 679    3 528    66 628    58 788    125 416
State-owned Banks     300     11     311    13 856    4 546    18 402    10 992    8 575    19 567     424     376     800    25 572    13 508    39 080
Privately-owned Banks    1 362     145    1 507    13 890    10 160    24 050    21 605    30 349    51 954    1 232    1 127    2 359    38 089    41 781    79 870
Foreign Banks     93     9     102     791     510    1 301    1 661    2 639    4 300     188     174     362    2 733    3 332    6 065
Banks Under the Deposits Insurance Fund     7     1     8     121     79     200     101     85     186     5     2     7     234     167     401
Non-depository Banks (Dev. & Inv. Banks)     78     14     92     861     302    1 163    1 759    1 065    2 824     230     162     392    2 928    1 543    4 471
June 30,  
2005
Dec. 31, 
2002
Dec. 31, 
2003
Dec. 31, 
2004
as of Primary School High School Undergraduate Masters or PhD Total
 
Source: Banks Association of Turkey (BAT). 
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Table 9: Distribution of Bank Employees by Gender and Education (1997-2005, Sector Total = 100.0), Part I 
Banks Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total
Sector Total 3.7 0.3 4.0 37.6 20.4 57.9 18.2 18.1 36.3 0.9 0.8 1.7 60.5 39.5 100.0
Commercial Banks 3.6 0.3 3.8 36.9 20.0 56.9 17.0 17.4 34.4 0.8 0.7 1.5 58.3 38.4 96.6
State-owned Banks 1.8 0.2 1.9 21.4 9.4 30.8 6.7 4.9 11.6 0.2 0.2 0.4 30.1 14.6 44.7
Privately-owned Banks 1.7 0.1 1.8 15.0 10.3 25.3 9.8 11.7 21.5 0.4 0.4 0.8 27.0 22.4 49.5
Foreign Banks 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.5 0.4 0.8 0.5 0.8 1.3 0.1 0.1 0.2 1.2 1.3 2.5
Banks Under the Deposits Insurance Fund 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Non-depository Banks (Dev. & Inv. Banks) 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.7 0.3 1.0 1.2 0.7 1.9 0.2 0.1 0.3 2.2 1.2 3.4
Sector Total 3.1 0.3 3.4 36.2 19.8 56.0 17.0 17.3 34.3 3.0 3.3 6.3 59.4 40.6 100.0
Commercial Banks 3.0 0.3 3.3 35.6 19.5 55.0 15.9 16.6 32.5 2.9 3.1 6.0 57.3 39.5 96.8
State-owned Banks 1.6 0.1 1.7 20.4 8.6 29.0 6.1 4.2 10.3 1.1 0.7 1.8 29.1 13.6 42.7
Privately-owned Banks 1.3 0.2 1.5 14.7 10.6 25.3 9.3 11.5 20.9 1.7 2.3 4.0 27.1 24.6 51.7
Foreign Banks 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.7 0.5 0.9 1.4 0.1 0.1 0.2 1.1 1.3 2.4
Banks Under the Deposits Insurance Fund 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Non-depository Banks (Dev. & Inv. Banks) 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.7 0.3 1.0 1.1 0.7 1.8 0.2 0.1 0.3 2.1 1.1 3.2
Sector Total 2.9 0.2 3.1 34.3 19.1 53.4 20.3 21.4 41.7 1.0 0.9 1.9 58.5 41.5 100.0
Commercial Banks 2.8 0.2 2.9 33.7 18.8 52.5 19.1 20.7 39.9 0.9 0.8 1.6 56.4 40.4 96.9
State-owned Banks 1.4 0.1 1.4 19.2 8.0 27.2 7.4 4.9 12.3 0.2 0.2 0.4 28.2 13.2 41.4
Privately-owned Banks 1.1 0.1 1.2 11.7 8.3 20.0 9.4 12.4 21.8 0.5 0.4 0.9 22.7 21.2 43.9
Foreign Banks 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.7 0.5 1.0 1.5 0.1 0.1 0.2 1.1 1.3 2.4
Banks Under the Deposits Insurance Fund 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Non-depository Banks (Dev. & Inv. Banks) 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.6 0.3 0.9 1.1 0.7 1.8 0.2 0.1 0.3 2.0 1.1 3.1
Sector Total 2.1 0.1 2.2 33.3 17.0 50.3 22.1 23.4 45.6 1.1 0.9 1.9 58.5 41.5 100.0
Commercial Banks 2.0 0.1 2.1 32.6 16.7 49.3 20.9 22.7 43.6 0.9 0.8 1.7 56.4 40.3 96.7
State-owned Banks 0.9 0.1 0.9 18.2 6.4 24.6 8.6 6.6 15.2 0.3 0.2 0.5 28.0 13.2 41.2
Privately-owned Banks 0.8 0.0 0.8 11.2 7.7 18.9 9.2 11.9 21.1 0.4 0.4 0.8 21.6 20.1 41.6
Foreign Banks 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.5 0.9 1.4 0.1 0.1 0.2 1.0 1.2 2.2
Banks Under the Deposits Insurance Fund 0.3 0.0 0.3 3.0 2.3 5.2 2.6 3.4 6.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 5.9 5.8 11.7
Non-depository Banks (Dev. & Inv. Banks) 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.6 0.3 0.9 1.2 0.7 1.9 0.2 0.1 0.3 2.1 1.1 3.3
Sector Total 1.6 0.1 1.7 31.5 15.3 46.9 23.6 24.8 48.4 1.1 0.9 2.1 57.9 41.1 100.0
Commercial Banks 1.5 0.1 1.6 30.8 15.0 45.8 22.2 23.9 46.1 1.0 0.8 1.8 55.4 39.8 96.2
State-owned Banks 0.6 0.0 0.6 17.3 5.6 22.8 9.8 7.0 16.8 0.3 0.3 0.6 28.0 12.8 40.8
Privately-owned Banks 0.7 0.0 0.7 11.6 8.1 19.6 10.7 14.7 25.4 0.5 0.5 1.0 23.5 23.3 46.8
Foreign Banks 0.1 0.0 0.1 1.3 0.9 2.3 0.9 1.0 1.9 0.0 0.0 0.1 2.4 2.0 4.6
Banks Under the Deposits Insurance Fund 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.6 0.4 1.1 0.8 1.2 1.9 0.1 0.1 0.2 1.5 1.7 3.9
Non-depository Banks (Dev. & Inv. Banks) 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.8 0.3 1.1 1.5 0.9 2.3 0.2 0.1 0.3 2.5 1.3 3.8
Masters or PhD Total
as of
Primary School High School Undergraduate
Dec. 31, 
2001
Dec. 31, 
2000
Dec. 31, 
1999
Dec. 31, 
1997
Dec. 31, 
1998
 
Source: Banks Association of Turkey (BAT); author’s own calculations. 
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Table 9: Distribution of Bank Employees by Gender and Education (1997-2005, Sector Total = 100.0), Part II 
Banks Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total
Sector Total 1.2 0.1 1.3 28.2 14.3 42.5 25.1 28.3 53.5 1.4 1.2 2.7 56.0 44.0 100.0
Commercial Banks 1.1 0.1 1.2 27.4 14.0 41.4 23.6 27.4 51.0 1.3 1.1 2.4 53.4 42.6 96.0
State-owned Banks 0.3 0.0 0.3 13.2 4.3 17.5 8.3 6.0 14.3 0.3 0.2 0.5 22.0 10.6 32.6
Privately-owned Banks 0.7 0.1 0.8 12.5 8.5 21.1 12.9 18.1 31.0 0.7 0.6 1.4 26.9 27.3 54.2
Foreign Banks 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.7 0.5 1.2 1.1 1.6 2.8 0.2 0.2 0.3 2.1 2.3 4.4
Banks Under the Deposits Insurance Fund 0.1 0.0 0.1 1.0 0.7 1.7 1.3 1.6 2.9 0.1 0.1 0.2 2.4 2.4 4.8
Non-depository Banks (Dev. & Inv. Banks) 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.8 0.3 1.1 1.5 0.9 2.5 0.2 0.1 0.3 2.6 1.4 4.0
Sector Total 1.5 0.1 1.7 25.7 13.0 38.7 26.4 30.6 57.0 1.4 1.2 2.7 55.1 44.9 100.0
Commercial Banks 1.5 0.1 1.6 25.0 12.7 37.6 25.0 29.7 54.7 1.3 1.1 2.4 52.6 43.6 96.2
State-owned Banks 0.3 0.0 0.3 11.9 3.8 15.8 8.3 6.0 14.3 0.3 0.2 0.5 20.8 10.1 30.8
Privately-owned Banks 1.1 0.1 1.2 11.5 7.9 19.4 14.6 20.6 35.2 0.8 0.7 1.5 28.0 29.3 57.3
Foreign Banks 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.7 0.5 1.2 1.1 1.8 2.9 0.1 0.1 0.3 2.1 2.4 4.4
Banks Under the Deposits Insurance Fund 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.5 1.3 0.9 1.3 2.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 1.8 1.9 3.7
Non-depository Banks (Dev. & Inv. Banks) 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.7 0.3 1.0 1.5 0.9 2.3 0.2 0.1 0.3 2.5 1.3 3.8
Sector Total 1.4 0.1 1.5 24.0 12.4 36.4 27.1 32.2 59.3 1.5 1.4 2.9 53.9 46.1 100.0
Commercial Banks 1.3 0.1 1.4 23.3 12.1 35.4 25.7 31.3 57.0 1.3 1.2 2.6 51.6 44.9 96.4
State-owned Banks 0.3 0.0 0.3 11.1 3.7 14.8 8.6 6.8 15.4 0.3 0.3 0.6 20.3 10.7 31.0
Privately-owned Banks 1.0 0.1 1.1 11.4 8.0 19.4 15.8 22.5 38.3 0.9 0.8 1.7 29.0 31.4 60.5
Foreign Banks 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.7 0.4 1.1 1.2 2.0 3.1 0.2 0.1 0.3 2.1 2.6 4.6
Banks Under the Deposits Insurance Fund 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.3
Non-depository Banks (Dev. & Inv. Banks) 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.7 0.2 0.9 1.4 0.8 2.2 0.2 0.1 0.3 2.3 1.2 3.6
Sector Total 1.4 0.1 1.6 22.7 12.0 34.7 27.8 32.9 60.7 1.6 1.4 3.0 53.6 46.4 100.0
Commercial Banks 1.4 0.1 1.5 22.1 11.8 33.8 26.5 32.1 58.5 1.4 1.3 2.7 51.3 45.3 96.6
State-owned Banks 0.2 0.0 0.2 10.7 3.5 14.2 8.5 6.6 15.1 0.3 0.3 0.6 19.7 10.4 30.1
Privately-owned Banks 1.0 0.1 1.2 10.7 7.8 18.5 16.6 23.4 40.0 0.9 0.9 1.8 29.3 32.2 61.5
Foreign Banks 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.6 0.4 1.0 1.3 2.0 3.3 0.1 0.1 0.3 2.1 2.6 4.7
Banks Under the Deposits Insurance Fund 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.3
Non-depository Banks (Dev. & Inv. Banks) 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.7 0.2 0.9 1.4 0.8 2.2 0.2 0.1 0.3 2.3 1.2 3.4
Dec. 31, 
2004
June 30,  
2005
Dec. 31, 
2002
Dec. 31, 
2003
as of Primary School High School Undergraduate Masters or PhD Total
 
Source: Banks Association of Turkey (BAT); author’s own calculations. 
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Table 10: Total Employment in Turkey, by economic activity (thousands, 2000 – 2004) 
 
Total men and women 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
All Sectors 21581 21524 21354 21147 21791 
Financial Intermediation 281 258 238 229 237 
Banking Sector (incl. non-dep. ban.) * 170 137 123 123 127 
Commercial Banking * 165 132 118 119 123 
State-owned Banks * 70 56 40 38 40 
Privately-owned Banks * 71 64 67 71 77 
Foreign Banks * 4 6 5 5 6 
Banks under SDIF * 20 5 6 5 0 
Other Sectors 21300 21266 21116 20918 21554 
Men 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
All Sectors 15780 15555 15232 15256 16023 
Financial Intermediation 172 168 158 151 153 
Banking Sector (incl. non-dep. ban.) * 100 80 69 68 69 
Commercial Banking * 96 76 66 65 66 
State-owned Banks * 48 38 27 26 26 
Privately-owned Banks * 37 32 33 35 37 
Foreign Banks * 2 3 3 3 3 
Banks under SDIF * 10 2 3 2 0 
Other Sectors 15608 15387 15074 15105 15870 
Women 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
All Sectors 5801 5969 6122 5891 5768 
Financial Intermediation 109 90 80 78 84 
Banking Sector (incl. non-dep. ban.) * 71 57 54 55 59 
Commercial Banking * 69 55 52 54 57 
State-owned Banks * 23 18 13 12 14 
Privately-owned Banks * 34 32 34 36 40 
Foreign Banks * 2 3 3 3 3 
Banks under SDIF * 10 2 3 2 0 
Other Sectors 5692 5879 6042 5813 5684 
Source: SIS, Household Labour Force Survey, Ankara; ILO (http://laborsta.ilo.org); and BAT, İstanbul. 
Note: Employed persons are those persons that are aged 15 years or over who, during the reference week, worked for at least 
one hour as regular or casual employees, employers, self-employed persons or unpaid family workers (persons at work), 
and persons with a job who did not work, during the reference week, for various reasons but had a job attachment 
(persons not at work). 
* Employment data for the banking sector is taken from the Banks Association of Turkey (BAT). These figures are as end of the 
respective year. 
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Table 11: Unemployment in Turkey, by economic activity (thousands, 2000 – 2004) 
 
Total men and women 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
All Sectors 1497 1967 2464 2493 2498 
Unemployed seeking their first job 467 477 513 480 612 
Financial Intermediation 12 19 26 22 18 
Other Sectors 1018 1471 1925 1991 1868 
Men 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
All Sectors 1111 1485 1826 1830 1878 
Unemployed seeking their first job 282 273 279 262 361 
Financial Intermediation 6 11 14 11 9 
Other Sectors 823 1201 1533 1557 1508 
Women 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
All Sectors 387 482 638 663 620 
Unemployed seeking their first job 186 204 234 218 251 
Financial Intermediation 6 8 12 11 8 
Other Sectors 195 270 392 434 361 
Source: SIS, Household Labour Force Survey, Ankara, and ILO (http://laborsta.ilo.org). 
Note: Unemployed persons are those persons that are aged 15 years or over (including persons subject to compulsory 
schooling or retired and receiving a pension) who, during the reference week, were not employed, had taken specific 
steps to obtain a job during the last three months and were available to start work within 15 days. Also considered as 
unemployed are persons who had already found a job or established their own enterprise but were waiting for documents 
to be completed in order to start work and were available to work within 15 days, as well as full- or part-time students 
seeking full- or part-time work and available to work within 15 days. Note that population groups are classified by 
industry according to their previous work experience. 
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Table 12: Restructuring of and Employment in State-owned Banks 
Dec. 
1997
Dec. 
1998
Dec. 
1999
Dec. 
2000
Dec. 
2001 Dec. 2002
Dec. 
2003
Dec. 
2004
March 
2005
June 
2005 Remarks
State-owned Banks (as of 2000)                  
[Ziraatbank + Halkbank + Vakıfbank + 
Emlakbank]
67,496 71,072 72,007 70,191 56,108 40,158 37,994 39,467 39,214 39,080
Starting from December 2000 the cumulative decline in number of employees climbed to 14,083 
persons until December 2001, 30,033 persons until December 2002 and 32,197 persons until 
December 2003.
State-owned Banks (as of 2005)                  
[Ziraatbank + Halkbank + Vakıfbank]
57,165 60,469 61,730 60,191 56,108 40,158 37,994 39,467 39,214 39,080
Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Ziraat Bankası A.Ş. 
(Ziraatbank) 33,343 36,460 37,705 36,576 33,023 23,330 22,138 21,172 21,053 21,037
Established in 1863 as a state-owned bank.
Türkiye Halk Bankası A.Ş. (Halkbank) 14,447 14,559 14,843 15,025 14,956 9,228 8,515 11,145 10,981 10,841
Established in 1938 as a state-owned bank.
Türkiye Vakıflar Bankası T.A.O. 
(Vakıfbank) 9,375 9,450 9,182 8,590 8,129 7,600 7,341 7,150 7,180 7,202
Established in 1954 as a bank owned by the GDF.* During the crisis, it was able to acquire deposits 
from struggling banks in BRSA deposit auctions and increase its market share. The regulatory 
changes have accelerated Vakıfbank’s process of strengthening internal control systems and risk 
management procedures. Following a company-wide restructuring program to boost sale efficiency, 
it is in a block sale process as of mid November 2005.
Türkiye Emlak Bankası A.Ş. (Emlakbank) 10,331 10,603 10,277 10,000
Established in 1927 as a state-owned bank.
Pamukbank T.A.Ş. 4,809 5,494 5,733 5,784 5,425 4,974 4,040
Established in 1955 as a privately-owned bank.
turned over to Ziraatbank in June 2001, and then, it's 96 out of 
406 branches are transferred to Halkbank in November 2001
was transferred to SDIF on 19 
June 2002, and then, to 
Halkbank on 12 November 
2004  
Source: Banks Association of Turkey (BAT), Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (BRSA) and State Deposit Insurance Fund (SDIF); author’s own calculations. 
* The General Directorate of Foundations (GDF) owns the majority shares in Vakıbank. The GDF was established in 1924 to administer and regulate existing and future Turkish charitable foundations as a state entity 
directly reporting to the Prime Minister. The GDF is a separate legal entity and has its own budget. It was given the authority to establish a bank subject to the Incorporation Law for the purpose of managing 
foundations’ revenues and expenses. 
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Table 13: Resolution of and Employment in SDIF Banks 
Dec. 1997 Dec. 1998 Dec. 1999 Dec. 2000 Dec. 2001 Dec. 2002 Dec. 2003 Dec. 2004 March 2005 June 2005
All Banks 154,864 166,492 173,988 170,401 137,495 123,271 123,249 127,163 128,271 129,887  -  -  - 
Non-state-owned and Non-
SDIF banks 81,115 90,573 86,001 80,315 74,996 77,227 80,737 87,293 88,652 90,406  -  -  - 
State-owned Banks (as of 
corresponding year) 69,218 71,072 72,007 70,191 56,108 40,158 37,994 39,467 39,214 39,080  -  -  - 
Banks under the Control of 
SDIF 4,531 4,847 15,980 19,895 6,391 5,886 4,518 403 405 401 39409 11635 27774
Türkbank 4,531 4,180 4,025 3,664 2,438 4,790 0 4,790
618 654 563 578 565 546
Esbank 2,070 2,241 2,291 1,898 2,363  -  - 
Yaşarbank 1,609 1,755 1,810 1,626 1,821  -  - 
569 3,590 3,919 4,199 4,321 4,356
Interbank 1,107 1,712 1,525 1,320 1,732  -  - 
Egebank 1,123 1,464 3,394 1,990 4,288  -  - 
Yurtbank 434 552 590 563 668  -  - 
3,645 3,525 3,477 3,652 3,641 3,787
Etibank A.Ş. 1,722 1,872 1,988 2,035 2,076 (1,106)  - 
Bank Kapital 431 590 624 538 666  -  - 
Ulusalbank 143 197 231 251 216  -  - 
İktisat Bankası 1,007 1,110 1,321 1,339 1,305  (131)  - 
EGS Bank 754 1,022 1,077 1,004 409 918  (39)  - 
Kentbank 1,167 1,734 1,666 1,766 1,422 (456)  - 
Toprakbank 2,479 2,986 3,253 2,505 2,458 2,482  (733)  - 
97 200 215 219 231
2,860 3,240 4,344 4,482 4,629
        Demirbank 3,565
HSBC (# fo employees as of Dec. Dec. 2000: 110)
1,603 2,018 2,556 4,225
was refined in December 2001; however, on March 20, 2002 the 
liquidation decision was revoked and the Bank was merged into 
Bayındırbank
On August 9, 2002, in accordance with the liquidation resolution, all 
branches of the Bank were closed and employment contracts of all 
personnel working in head Office units and branches were terminated 
and special service contract was signed with personnel in limited 
numbers in order to make transactions concerned with the liquidation.
merged with Sümerbank on January 26, 2001
merged with Sümerbank on April 17, 2001
sold to the Tekfen Holding on June 30, 2001; the transfer was approved by 
the BRSA on October 26, 2001; still operating as Tekfenbank 
privatized in 1997, was taken under SDIF in 2000, and finally refined in 
December 2001; however, on March 20, 2002 the liquidation decision was 
revoked and the Bank was merged into Bayındırbank
banking and deposit taking license was revoked as of 
January 18, 2002, and merged into Bayındırbank as 
of the same date
merged with Etibank bank on April 15, 2001
merged with Sümerbank on January 26, 2001
was sold to the Oyak Group on August 9, 2001; merger was 
approved on January 11, 2002; still operating as Oyakbank
merged with Etibank bank on April 15, 2001
merged with Sümerbank on January 26, 2001
merged with Sümerbank on January 26, 2001
sold to HSBC on September 20, 2001; approval of the transfer 
was made on October 30, 2001
a share transfer agreement was signed with Novabank (Greece) 
on December 20, 2001; the transfer procedure was carried out 
on January 25, 2002; it's name changed to BankEuropa in 
early 2003146        Sitebank 178
        Tarişbank 744 740 721 647 526
653
302 343 320
banking and deposit taking license of the bank was 
revoked as of September 30, 2002 and merged into 
Bayındırbank as of the same date
1,407
Oyakbank (# of employees in Dec. 2000: 386)
        Bank Ekspres 517
        Sümerbank 1,392 1,788 1,692
667
3,198
629
Tekfenbank (# of employees in Dec. 2000: 58)
Denizbank (# of emp. As of Dec. 2001: 949)
345
146
618
BankEuropa
share transfer agreement regarding the acquisition by 
Denizbank was signed on October 21, 2002; the merger was 
approved on December 19, 2002 and finalized on December 
27, 2003
was liquidated on December 7, 2001; however, on 4 April 2002 the 
liquidation decision was revoked and the Bank was merged under 
Bayındırbank
6,159
103
676
107
Number of 
Emlpoyees Who 
Changed their 
Bank during 
Resolution 
Process**
Number of 
Employees 
Who Lost or 
Changed their 
Job
183
Number of Employees
Number of 
Emlpoyees as of 
the Date of 
Transfer to 
SDIF
721
1,698
4,241
253
528
 
Source: Banks Association of Turkey (BAT), Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (BRSA) and State Deposit Insurance 
Fund (SDIF); author’s own calculations. 
* The shaded cells indicate the years in which the corresponding bank was under the control of SDIF. 
** The employee numbers in parantheses in this column show the number of employees transferred to Bayındırbank by SDIF. 
Therefore, they are not considered in calculation of total number of employees who have been transferred to other banks 
with merged or sold SDIF banks. The total number of emlpoyees of banks which have been merged to Bayındırbank as of 
the date of the initial transfer to SDIF, however, are added to the number of employees of Bayındırbank as of the date of take 
over to calculate the overall number of employees who became unemployed during merger with Bayındırbank. 
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Note: In understanding the changes in figures given in the table above, it should also be considered that SDIF has hired some 
new personnel to carry out the resolution and restructuring operations in some of the SDIF banks before merging or selling 
them. 
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Table 14: Estimation of Unemployment Effects Resulting from Restructuring and Resolution of 
Banks in Turkey (1997-2004) 
Total Number of Employees 
Involved in Restructuring or 
Resolution of Banks 
(1997-2004)  
Restructuring of 
State-owned 
Banks 
(1999-2003) 
Resolution of 
Non-state 
Banks 
Transferred to 
SDIF 
(1997-2004) in persons 
as percent of total # of 
employees in banking 
in Dec. 1999 
Total Number of Employees 
who Lost or Changed their Job 
Place 
34,013 39,409 73,422 42.2 % 
Number of Employees 
Transferred to Other State 
Institutions or Other Banks 
14,352 
(to other 
state institutions) 
11,635 
(to other 
banks) 
25,987 14.9 % 
Number of Pensioned 
Employees 17,648 
Others (unemployed, etc.) 2,013 
27,774 47,435 27.3 % 
Source: Banks Association of Turkey (BAT), Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (BRSA) and State Deposit Insurance 
Fund (SDIF); author’s own calculations. 
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Table 15: Ziraatbank, Halkbank and Pamukbank: Distribution of Employees by Gender and Education (1997-2005) 
Male 
(percent)
Female 
(percent)
Total 
(percent)
Male 
(percent)
Female 
(percent)
Total 
(percent)
Male 
(percent)
Female 
(percent)
Total 
(percent)
Male 
(percent)
Female 
(percent)
Total 
(percent)
Male 
(percent)
Female 
(percent)
Total 
(percent)
Total 
(persons)
December 1997 4.0 0.5 4.5 54.5 18.9 73.4 12.4 8.6 21.0 0.6 0.5 1.0 71.5 28.5 100.0    33 343
December 1998 3.8 0.2 4.0 53.8 18.6 72.4 14.5 8.1 22.5 0.6 0.4 1.0 72.6 27.4 100.0    36 460
December 1999 3.5 0.1 3.7 52.1 18.9 71.0 16.1 8.2 24.3 0.6 0.4 1.0 72.3 27.7 100.0    37 705
December 2000 1.4 0.1 1.6 48.8 12.9 61.6 20.7 14.9 35.6 0.7 0.5 1.3 71.6 28.4 100.0    36 576
December 2001 1.0 0.1 1.1 45.7 10.6 56.3 24.9 15.9 40.8 1.0 0.8 1.8 72.5 27.5 100.0    33 023
December 2002 0.1 0.0 0.1 44.0 10.3 54.4 26.8 16.8 43.6 1.1 0.9 1.9 72.0 28.0 100.0    23 330
December 2003 0.0 0.0 0.0 41.9 9.2 51.1 29.0 18.0 47.0 1.1 0.8 1.8 71.9 28.1 100.0    22 138
December 2004 0.0 0.0 0.0 40.9 8.4 49.2 30.2 18.5 48.6 1.2 1.0 2.1 72.2 27.8 100.0    21 172
September 2005 0.0 0.0 0.0 39.9 7.9 47.7 31.1 18.7 49.8 1.3 1.1 2.4 72.3 27.7 100.0    20 499
Ziraatbank
Primary School High School Undergraduate Masters or PhD Total
 
Male 
(percent)
Female 
(percent)
Total 
(percent)
Male 
(percent)
Female 
(percent)
Total 
(percent)
Male 
(percent)
Female 
(percent)
Total 
(percent)
Male 
(percent)
Female 
(percent)
Total 
(percent)
Male 
(percent)
Female 
(percent)
Total 
(percent)
Total 
(persons)
December 1997 3.6 0.1 3.7 48.8 21.7 70.5 14.7 10.5 25.2 0.4 0.2 0.6 67.5 32.5 100.0    14 447
December 1998 3.0 0.1 3.1 48.3 19.7 68.0 16.4 11.9 28.2 0.4 0.2 0.6 68.1 31.9 100.0    14 559
December 1999 2.8 0.1 2.9 45.2 17.4 62.6 19.5 14.4 33.8 0.4 0.2 0.6 67.9 32.1 100.0    14 843
December 2000 2.5 0.1 2.6 43.4 15.9 59.3 22.1 15.4 37.5 0.4 0.2 0.6 68.4 31.6 100.0    15 025
December 2001 1.8 0.1 1.9 42.4 16.0 58.5 22.5 16.3 38.9 0.5 0.3 0.8 67.2 32.8 100.0    14 956
December 2002 1.9 0.0 1.9 41.6 14.2 55.8 23.7 17.7 41.4 0.5 0.4 0.9 67.7 32.3 100.0    9 228
December 2003 1.9 0.0 1.9 40.3 13.3 53.6 24.7 18.7 43.4 0.6 0.5 1.1 67.4 32.6 100.0    8 515
December 2004 1.4 0.0 1.4 32.2 12.9 45.1 25.9 25.5 51.4 1.1 1.0 2.1 60.6 39.4 100.0    11 145
September 2005 1.2 0.0 1.2 31.6 12.4 44.0 26.4 26.4 52.7 1.2 0.8 2.0 60.4 39.6 100.0    10 671
Halkbank
Primary School High School Undergraduate Masters or PhD Total
 
Male 
(percent)
Female 
(percent)
Total 
(percent)
Male 
(percent)
Female 
(percent)
Total 
(percent)
Male 
(percent)
Female 
(percent)
Total 
(percent)
Male 
(percent)
Female 
(percent)
Total 
(percent)
Male 
(percent)
Female 
(percent)
Total 
(percent)
Total 
(persons)
December 1997 1.2 0.0 1.2 21.3 18.3 39.6 27.3 31.5 58.9 0.3 0.1 0.4 50.1 49.9 100.0   4 809
December 1998 1.1 0.0 1.1 21.1 17.7 38.8 27.8 32.0 59.8 0.2 0.1 0.3 50.2 49.8 100.0    5 494
December 1999 1.0 0.0 1.0 20.1 15.8 35.9 28.3 34.5 62.8 0.2 0.0 0.3 49.6 50.4 100.0    5 733
December 2000 0.9 0.0 0.9 19.5 14.9 34.3 29.2 35.3 64.5 0.2 0.0 0.2 49.8 50.2 100.0    5 784
December 2001 0.7 0.0 0.7 19.1 14.4 33.4 29.5 36.0 65.5 0.2 0.1 0.3 49.6 50.4 100.0    5 425
December 2002 0.8 0.0 0.8 19.2 13.8 33.0 26.9 35.8 62.7 1.7 1.7 3.4 48.7 51.3 100.0    4 974
December 2003 0.4 0.0 0.4 20.0 13.3 33.3 26.0 36.7 62.7 1.7 1.9 3.5 48.1 51.9 100.0    4 040
September 2004 0.8 0.0 0.8 19.7 13.6 33.3 25.9 36.6 62.5 1.7 1.7 3.4 48.0 52.0 100.0    3 773
Pamukbank
Masters or PhD TotalPrimary School High School Undergraduate
 
Source: Banks Association of Turkey (BAT); author’s own calculations. 
Note: Pamukbank was transferred to SDIF on 19 June 2002, and then, merged with Halkbank, which is a state-owned bank, on 12 November 2004. As of the date of merger, the number of employees who have been 
transferred to Halkbank were 3,763. 
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Table 16: Unionisation in Non-state Banks and Insurance Companies 
Jan. 
1984
Jan. 
1997 July 2000 Jan. 2001 July 2001 Jan. 2002 July 2002 Jan. 2003 July 2003 July 2004 Jan. 2005 July 2005
July 
2000
Jan. 
2001
July 
2001
Jan. 
2002
July 
2002
Jan. 
2003
July 
2003
July 
2004
Jan. 
2005
July 
2005
Unionised Workers  73 628  98 666  113 089  114 783  117 275  117 258  118 017  119 120  121 240  124 077  129 577  129 851 98.0 98.1 102.1 98.8 101.2 99.3 97.2 89.0 93.0 90.0
Banka ve Sigorta İşçileri Sendikası (BASİSEN), 
Union of Bank and Insurance Workers , established 
in 1964, affiliated with the Confederation of Turkish 
Trade Unions (TÜRK-İŞ), internet: 
www.basisen.org.tr, email: basisen@isbank-net.tr
 32 407  44 878  53 382  54 391  55 775  55 418  55 633  56 154  57 262  58 899  60 365  62 961 46.3 46.5 48.6 46.7 47.7 46.8 45.9 42.3 43.3 43.6
Banka ve Sigorta İşçileri Sendikası (BANKSİS), 
Union of Bank and Insurance Workers , established 
in 1983, independent trade union  12 935  15 291  18 702  18 971  19 313  19 519  20 018  20 582  21 561  22 515  22 311  24 587 16.2 16.2 16.8 16.5 17.2 17.2 17.3 16.2 16.0 17.0
Türkiye Devrimci Banka ve Sigorta İşçileri (BANK-
SEN), Revolutionary Union of Workers in Banks 
and Insurance Companies , established in 1972, 
affiliated with the Confederation of Progressive Trade 
Unions of Turkey (DİSK), internet: 
www.banksen.org.tr
 18 000  14 871  15 062  15 070  15 070  15 070  15 083  15 102  15 102  15 102  18 569  13 961 13.1 12.9 13.1 12.7 12.9 12.6 12.1 10.8 13.3 9.7
Banka ve Sigorta İşçileri Sendikası (BASS), Bank 
and Insurance Employees Union , established in 
1972, affiliated with the Confederation. of Turkish 
Trade Unions (TÜRK-İŞ), internet: www.bass-
sen.org.tr
 4 741  12 589  14 627  15 027  15 116  15 155  15 179  15 178  15 210  15 466  16 239  16 264 12.7 12.8 13.2 12.8 13.0 12.7 12.2 11.1 11.6 11.3
Banka ve Sigorta İşçileri Sendikası (BANK-Sİ-SEN), 
Union of Bank and Insurance Workers  established in 
1964, independent trade union  5 545  11 037  11 316  11 324  12 001  12 096  12 104  12 104  12 105  12 095  12 093  12 078 9.8 9.7 10.4 10.2 10.4 10.1 9.7 8.7 8.7 8.4
Non-unionised Workers n.a. n.a.  2 297  2 212 - 2 418  1 369 - 1 407   862  3 438  15 323  9 823  14 391 2.0 1.9 -2.1 1.2 -1.2 0.7 2.8 11.0 7.0 10.0
Total Workers n.a. n.a.  115 386  116 995  114 857  118 627  116 610  119 982  124 678  139 400  139 400  144 242 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Number of Workers in Non-state Banks & Insurance Companies Share of Workers (in percent)
 
Source: Ministry of Labour and Social Security, Ankara, and the Official Journal of the Republic of Turkey, various issues. 
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Table 17: Unionisation in State-owned Banks and Insurance Companies 
15 July 2004 15 May 2005
Unionised Workers  65 485  62 866
Türkiye Büro, Bankacılık ve Sigortacılık Hizmet Kolu Kamu Çalışanları Sendikası (TÜRK BÜRO-SEN), 
Union of Employees in Public-Sector Offices, Banks and Insurance Companies , established in 1992, 
affiliated with the Türkiye Kamu Çalışanları Sendikaları Konfederasyonu (TÜRKİYE KAMU-SEN), 
internet: www.turkburosen.org.tr
 28 902  28 132
Tüm Banka ve Sigorta Çalışanları Sendikası (TÜM BANKA-SEN), Trade Union of All Bank and 
Insurance Workers , established in 1993, affiliated with the Union of Office Workers (BES) & Confederation 
of Trade Unions of Public Employees (KESK), internet: www.bes.org.tr  28 491  25 564
Büro Memurları Sendikası (BÜRO MEMUR-SEN), Union of Civil Servants Working in Offices, Banks 
and Insurance Companies , established in 1995, affiliated with the Confederation of Union for Civil Servants 
(MEMUR-SEN), internet: www.buromemursen.org.tr  7 440  8 415
Bağımsız Büro Çalışanları Sendikası (BÇS), Independent Union of Office Employees , affiliated with the 
Bağımsız Kamu Görevlileri Sendikaları Konfederasyonu (BASK)   622   730
Hürriyetçi Büro Hizmetleri Sendikası (HÜR BÜRO-SEN), Union of Bank and Insurance Workers , 
affiliated with the Hürriyetçi Kamu Çalışanları Sendikaları Konfederasyonu (HÜRRİYETÇİ KAMU-SEN)   30   25
Non-unionised Workers  78 897  88 142
Total Workers  144 382  151 008
Number of Public Employees who 
Work in State-owned Banks, 
Insurance Companies and Offices
 
Source: Ministry of Labour and Social Security, Ankara, and the Official Journal of the Republic of Turkey, various issues. 
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Table 18: An Analysis of Recent Strengths and Weaknesses of the Turkish Banking Sector 
 
Strengths: 
1. In recent years, the major problems of the sector have been identified. 
2. Beside rules-based regulations, regulations to control the market are also created. 
3. Significant steps towards improvement and institutionalization of risk management are 
taken. 
4. The programme to restructure the banking sector has been started simultaneously with the 
introduction of economic policies targeting budget discipline and price stability. 
5. Regulations brought the system closer to international standards. 
6. Problem credits have been radically identified. 
7. Exchange rate risk has been minimised.  
8. Financial sector has a significant potential to growth further. 
9. Banks have a developed spectrum of products and services. 
10. The quality and degree of specialization of human resources is high. 
11. In technological terms, the Turkish banking sector is internationally competitive. 
12. Banks have developed branch networks and distribution channels. 
Weaknesses: 
1. The demand for financial assets is low. 
2. Financial markets are small not deepened enough. 
3. There are high risks in the working environment. 
4. Free equity capital is limited. 
5. Profitability does not positively affect the increases in equity capital.  
6. Regulations are revised and changed frequently and contradictorily among each other. 
7. Potential investors are faced with significant differences in taxation of financial assets. 
8. There is a significant crowding-out effect resulting from government spending. 
9. The share and effectiveness of the public sector within the system is still high. 
10. The process of improvements in asset quality is slow. 
11. Government’s decisions and implementations are not in accordance with the nature of 
financial markets. 
12. Cost of resources is high and the terms are very short. 
13. Currency substitution in Turkey is still very high. 
14. Intermediation costs are very high. Therefore, domestic banks have a disadvantage in 
competition with banks abroad. 
15. Some of the negative effects of accumulated problems still exist. 
Source: selected, summarised and translated from Working group for Financial Markets of BAT (2004). 
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